Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences. - Tomoya Kazumura; Shigehiro Serizawa (Soc. Choice Welf., 2016)

Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects. - Tomoya Tajika; Tomoya Kazumura (Int. J. Game Theory, 2019)

Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. - Tomoya Kazumura; Debasis Mishra; Shigehiro Serizawa (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Strategy-proofness and competitive equilibrium with transferable utility: Gross substitutes revisited. - Kenzo Imamura; Keisuke Bando; Tomoya Kazumura (EC, 2024)