Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms. - Hans Peters 001; Hans van der Stel; Ton Storcken (ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res., 1993)

Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes. - Hans Peters 001; Hans van der Stel; Ton Storcken (ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res., 1993)

Effectivity functions and simple games. - Ton Storcken (Int. J. Game Theory, 1997)

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences. - Lars Ehlers; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (J. Econ. Theory, 2002)

Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox. - Bezalel Peleg; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Math. Soc. Sci., 2002)

Choice correspondences for public goods. - Bettina Klaus; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2002)

Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems. - Lars Ehlers; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Games Econ. Behav., 2004)

Centers in Connected Undirected Graphs: An Axiomatic Approach. - Herman Monsuur; Ton Storcken (Oper. Res., 2004)

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences. - Bezalel Peleg; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Int. J. Game Theory, 2005)

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability. - Stefan Maus; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (J. Econ. Theory, 2007)

Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions. - Stefan Maus; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Math. Soc. Sci., 2007)

Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity. - Stefan Maus; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2007)

Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. - Lars Ehlers; Ton Storcken (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules. - Hans Peters 001; Souvik Roy; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2012)

Update monotone preference rules. - Burak Can; Ton Storcken (Math. Soc. Sci., 2013)

Measuring polarization in preferences. - Burak Can; Ali Ihsan Ozkes; Ton Storcken (Math. Soc. Sci., 2015)

Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model. - Abhinaba Lahiri; Hans Peters 001; Ton Storcken (Math. Soc. Sci., 2017)

Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval. - Abhinaba Lahiri; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2019)

On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules. - Edurne Falcó; Madhuparna Karmokar; Souvik Roy; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2020)

An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule. - Burak Can; Mohsen Pourpouneh; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2021)

Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information. - Shashwat Khare; Ton Storcken (Soc. Choice Welf., 2022)