Repeated proximity games. - Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Int. J. Game Theory, 1998)

Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. - Tristan Tomala (Int. J. Game Theory, 1998)

Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. - Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2004)

Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. - Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2004)

Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation. - Olivier Gossner; Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2006)

Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. - Olivier Gossner; Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2007)

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall. - Jérôme Renault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2007)

Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks. - Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (J. Cryptol., 2008)

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality. - Jérôme Renault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (Math. Soc. Sci., 2008)

Secure communication: A mechanism design approach. - Ludovic Renou; Tristan Tomala (GAMENETS, 2009)

Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. - Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

Informationally optimal correlation. - Olivier Gossner; Rida Laraki; Tristan Tomala (Math. Program., 2009)

Repeated Games with Complete Information. - Olivier Gossner; Tristan Tomala (Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009)

Mechanism design and communication networks. - Ludovic Renou; Tristan Tomala (BQGT, 2010)

General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. - Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Dyn. Games Appl., 2011)

Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems. - Tristan Tomala (Oper. Res., 2011)

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence. - Johannes Hörner; Stefano Lovo; Tristan Tomala (J. Econ. Theory, 2011)

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. - Yuval Heller; Eilon Solan; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2012)

Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. - Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (Int. J. Game Theory, 2012)

Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. - Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2013)

Secure message transmission on directed networks. - Jérôme Renault; Ludovic Renou; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2014)

Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. - Ludovic Renou; Tristan Tomala (J. Econ. Theory, 2015)

Information design for strategic coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utilities. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (Allerton, 2016)

Persuasion with limited communication resources. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2017)

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring. - Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala (J. Econ. Theory, 2017)

Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2018)

Zero-sum revision games. - Fabien Gensbittel; Stefano Lovo; Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2018)

Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows. - Marco Scarsini; Marc Schröder 002; Tristan Tomala (Oper. Res., 2018)

Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2019)

Persuasion with limited communication capacity. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (J. Econ. Theory, 2019)

Point-to-Point Strategic Communication. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (ITW, 2020)

Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Nonatomic Routing Games. - Emilien Macault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (WINE, 2020)

Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games. - Emilien Macault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2020)

Strategic Communication with Decoder Side Information. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (ISIT, 2021)

Information Design in Large Games. - Frédéric Koessler; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2021)

Social learning in nonatomic routing games. - Emilien Macault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Interactive Information Design. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala (Math. Oper. Res., 2022)

Corrigendum to "Social learning in nonatomic routing games" [Games Econ. Behav. 132 (2022) 221-233]. - Emilien Macault; Marco Scarsini; Tristan Tomala (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)

A Converse Bound on the Mismatched Distortion-Rate Function. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (ISIT, 2024)

A belief-based approach to signaling. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala (EC, 2024)

Splitting games over finite sets. - Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala (Math. Program., 2024)

Optimality and fairness of partisan gerrymandering. - Antoine Lagarde; Tristan Tomala (Math. Program., 2024)

Single-Letter Characterization of the Mismatched Distortion-Rate Function. - Maël Le Treust; Tristan Tomala (CoRR, 2025)