The Secure Boston Mechanism. - Umut Mert Dur; Robert Hammond; Thayer Morrill (EAI Endorsed Trans. Security Safety, 2016)

First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. - Umut Mert Dur; Timo Mennle; Sven Seuken (EC, 2018)

Competitive equilibria in school assignment. - Umut Mert Dur; Thayer Morrill (Games Econ. Behav., 2018)

The modified Boston mechanism. - Umut Mert Dur (Math. Soc. Sci., 2019)

Mechanism Design for Stable Matching with Contracts in a Dynamic Manufacturing-as-a-Service (MaaS) Marketplace. - Deepak Pahwa; Umut Mert Dur; Binil Starly (CoRR, 2020)

What you don't know can help you in school assignment. - Umut Mert Dur; Thayer Morrill (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools. - Umut Mert Dur; Parag A. Pathak; Tayfun Sönmez (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets. - Mustafa Oguz Afacan; Umut Mert Dur (Soc. Choice Welf., 2020)

School Choice with Hybrid Schedules. - Mustafa Oguz Afacan; Umut Mert Dur; William Harris (Games, 2021)

Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab. - Umut Mert Dur; Robert G. Hammond; Onur Kesten (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)

Capacity design in school choice. - Mustafa Oguz Afacan; Umut Mert Dur; Martin Van der Linden (Games Econ. Behav., 2024)

Rawlsian Matching. - Mustafa Oguz Afacan; Umut Mert Dur (Math. Soc. Sci., 2024)

Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system. - Abdullah Almeer; Umut Mert Dur; William Harris; Greg Hauser; William Phan; Yanning Zhang 002 (Math. Soc. Sci., 2024)

A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. - Umut Dur; Scott Paiement (Math. Soc. Sci., 2024)

Sequential school choice with public and private schools. - Tommy Andersson; Umut Dur; Sinan Ertemel; Onur Kesten (Soc. Choice Welf., 2024)

Partitionable choice functions and stability. - Umut Dur; Thayer Morrill; William Phan (Soc. Choice Welf., 2024)