Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI/IAAI, 2002)

Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI/IAAI, 2002)

Complexity of Mechanism Design. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (UAI, 2002)

Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (ICEC, 2003)

BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (ICML, 2003)

Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (IJCAI, 2003)

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (IJCAI, 2003)

Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (IJCAI, 2003)

Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (IJCAI, 2003)

Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2003)

How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? - Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang; Tuomas Sandholm (TARK, 2003)

Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. - Vincent Conitzer; Jonathan Derryberry; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2004)

Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2004)

Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AMEC, 2004)

An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAMAS, 2004)

Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). - Paolo Santi; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (COLT, 2004)

Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (ICML, 2004)

Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2004)

Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2004)

Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2004)

Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design. - Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2005)

Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2005)

A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2005)

Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm; Paolo Santi (AAAI, 2005)

Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. - Tuomas Sandholm; Andrew Gilpin; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2005)

Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. - Makoto Yokoo; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm; Naoki Ohta; Atsushi Iwasaki (AAAI, 2005)

A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. - Makoto Yokoo; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm; Naoki Ohta; Atsushi Iwasaki (JSAI Workshops, 2005)

Communication complexity of common voting rules. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2005)

Complexity of (iterated) dominance. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2005)

Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (UAI, 2005)

Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates. - Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2006)

Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings. - Vincent Conitzer; Andrew J. Davenport; Jayant Kalagnanam (AAAI, 2006)

Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2006)

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. - Naoki Ohta; Atsushi Iwasaki; Makoto Yokoo; Kohki Maruono; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAAI, 2006)

Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAMAS, 2006)

A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (AAMAS, 2006)

Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online). - Vincent Conitzer; Nikesh Garera (ICML, 2006)

Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2006)

Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (Artif. Intell., 2006)

Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award. - Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2007)

Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness. - Vincent Conitzer (Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 2007)

Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules. - Vincent Conitzer (Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 2007)

Incremental Mechanism Design. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (IJCAI, 2007)

Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. - Tuomas Sandholm; Vincent Conitzer; Craig Boutilier (IJCAI, 2007)

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2007)

When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm; Jérôme Lang (J. ACM, 2007)

AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (Mach. Learn., 2007)

Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2007)

Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting. - Liad Wagman; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2008)

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2008)

Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang (AAAI, 2008)

Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account. - Vincent Conitzer (AMEC/TADA, 2008)

Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS (2), 2008)

Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments. - Naoki Ohta; Vincent Conitzer; Yasufumi Satoh; Atsushi Iwasaki; Makoto Yokoo (AAMAS (2), 2008)

Strategic betting for competitive agents. - Liad Wagman; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS (2), 2008)

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2008)

A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2008)

Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2008)

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms. - Krzysztof R. Apt; Vincent Conitzer; Mingyu Guo; Evangelos Markakis (WINE, 2008)

An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games. - Joshua Letchford; Vincent Conitzer; Kamal Jain (WINE, 2008)

New complexity results about Nash equilibria. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (Games Econ. Behav., 2008)

Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2008)

Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2008)

Approximation guarantees for fictitious play. - Vincent Conitzer (Allerton, 2009)

Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market. - Joseph Farfel; Vincent Conitzer (AMMA, 2009)

A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market. - Joseph Farfel; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS (2), 2009)

Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations. - Naoki Ohta; Vincent Conitzer; Ryo Ichimura; Yuko Sakurai; Atsushi Iwasaki; Makoto Yokoo (CP, 2009)

How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda? - Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang; Lirong Xia (IJCAI, 2009)

Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation. - Vincent Conitzer; Matthew Rognlie; Lirong Xia (IJCAI, 2009)

Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games. - Erik Halvorson; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr (IJCAI, 2009)

Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2009)

Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules. - Lirong Xia; Michael Zuckerman; Ariel D. Procaccia; Vincent Conitzer; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein (IJCAI, 2009)

Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To. - Joshua Letchford; Vincent Conitzer; Kamesh Munagala (SAGT, 2009)

A qualitative vickrey auction. - Paul Harrenstein; Mathijs de Weerdt; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2009)

Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory. - Vincent Conitzer (UAI, 2009)

Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer; Daniel M. Reeves (WINE, 2009)

Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions. - Peng Shi 002; Vincent Conitzer; Mingyu Guo (WINE, 2009)

AAAI 2008 Workshop Reports. - Razvan C. Bunescu; Vitor R. Carvalho; Jan Chomicki; Vincent Conitzer; Michael T. Cox; Virginia Dignum; Zachary Dodds; Mark Dredze; David Furcy; Evgeniy Gabrilovich; Mehmet H. Göker; Hans W. Guesgen; et al. (AI Mag., 2009)

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (Games Econ. Behav., 2009)

Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries. - Vincent Conitzer (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2009)

Editor's puzzle: identifying the champion. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2009)

Editor's introduction. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2009)

Editor's puzzle: a dutch dutch auction clock auction. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2009)

Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2010)

Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games. - Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr (AAAI, 2010)

Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2010)

Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2010)

Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2010)

False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2010)

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. - Atsushi Iwasaki; Vincent Conitzer; Yoshifusa Omori; Yuko Sakurai; Taiki Todo; Mingyu Guo; Makoto Yokoo (AAMAS, 2010)

Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang (AAMAS, 2010)

Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness. - Zhengyu Yin; Dmytro Korzhyk; Christopher Kiekintveld; Vincent Conitzer; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2010)

10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. - Felix Brandt 001; Vincent Conitzer; Lane A. Hemaspaandra; Jean-François Laslier; William S. Zwicker (Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 2010)

10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. - Felix Brandt 001; Vincent Conitzer; Lane A. Hemaspaandra; Jean-François Laslier; William S. Zwicker (Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 2010)

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. - Joshua Letchford; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2010)

A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer; Ariel D. Procaccia (EC, 2010)

Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions. - Sayan Bhattacharya; Vincent Conitzer; Kamesh Munagala; Lirong Xia (SODA, 2010)

False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks. - Vincent Conitzer; Nicole Immorlica; Joshua Letchford; Kamesh Munagala; Liad Wagman (WINE, 2010)

Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (WINE, 2010)

Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (Artif. Intell., 2010)

Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations. - Vincent Conitzer; Makoto Yokoo (AI Mag., 2010)

Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting. - Vincent Conitzer (Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 2010)

Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents. - Vincent Conitzer (Commun. ACM, 2010)

Editor's puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2010)

Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem. - Vincent Conitzer (Metareasoning, 2011)

Commitment to Correlated Strategies. - Vincent Conitzer; Dmytro Korzhyk (AAAI, 2011)

Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information. - Vincent Conitzer; Toby Walsh; Lirong Xia (AAAI, 2011)

A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs. - Manish Jain; Dmytro Korzhyk; Ondrej Vanek; Vincent Conitzer; Michal Pechoucek; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2011)

Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability. - Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr (AAMAS, 2011)

Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains. - Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang; Lirong Xia (IJCAI, 2011)

Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources. - Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr (IJCAI, 2011)

A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2011)

Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer; Jérôme Lang (EC, 2011)

Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources. - Sayan Bhattacharya; Vincent Conitzer; Kamesh Munagala (WINE, 2011)

Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond. - Mingyu Guo; Victor Naroditskiy; Vincent Conitzer; Amy Greenwald; Nicholas R. Jennings (WINE, 2011)

An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections. - Michael Zuckerman; Piotr Faliszewski; Vincent Conitzer; Jeffrey S. Rosenschein (WINE, 2011)

Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness. - Joseph Farfel; Vincent Conitzer (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011)

Expressive markets for donating to charities. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (Artif. Intell., 2011)

Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness. - Dmytro Korzhyk; Zhengyu Yin; Christopher Kiekintveld; Vincent Conitzer; Milind Tambe (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011)

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011)

Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations". - Vincent Conitzer (AISTATS, 2011)

Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security. - Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2012)

Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games. - Joshua Letchford; Liam MacDermed; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr; Charles L. Isbell Jr. (AAAI, 2012)

Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections. - Bo Waggoner; Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2012)

An Undergraduate Course in the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. - Vincent Conitzer (EAAI, 2012)

Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains. - Lirong Xia; Vincent Conitzer (ISAIM, 2012)

Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach. - Vincent Conitzer; Lirong Xia (KR, 2012)

Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network. - Sayan Bhattacharya; Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer (WINE, 2012)

Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition. - Liad Wagman; Vincent Conitzer (Int. J. Game Theory, 2012)

Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. - Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2012)

Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases. - Vincent Conitzer; Curtis R. Taylor; Liad Wagman (Mark. Sci., 2012)

Should social network structure be taken into account in elections? - Vincent Conitzer (Math. Soc. Sci., 2012)

Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games. - Joshua Letchford; Liam MacDermed; Vincent Conitzer; Ronald Parr; Charles L. Isbell Jr. (SIGecom Exch., 2012)

Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games. - Garrett Andersen; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2013)

Solving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities. - Joshua Letchford; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2013)

Security scheduling for real-world networks. - Manish Jain; Vincent Conitzer; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2013)

Optimal internet auctions with costly communication. - Yuqian Li; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2013)

False-name-proof matching. - Taiki Todo; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2013)

Undominated Groves Mechanisms. - Mingyu Guo; Evangelos Markakis; Krzysztof R. Apt; Vincent Conitzer (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2013)

The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction. - Vincent Conitzer; R. Preston McAfee (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013)

Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time. - Vincent Conitzer; Angelina Vidali (AAAI, 2014)

On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules. - Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2014)

Beat the Cheater: Computing Game-Theoretic Strategies for When to Kick a Gambler out of a Casino. - Troels Bjerre Sørensen; Melissa Dalis; Joshua Letchford; Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2014)

Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains. - Haifeng Xu; Fei Fang 001; Albert Xin Jiang; Vincent Conitzer; Shaddin Dughmi; Milind Tambe (AAAI, 2014)

Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games. - Yuqian Li; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2014)

The Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks. - Vincent Conitzer (ISAIM, 2014)

On the value of commitment. - Joshua Letchford; Dmytro Korzhyk; Vincent Conitzer (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2014)

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions. - Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (Artif. Intell., 2014)

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties. - Mathijs Michiel de Weerdt; Paul Harrenstein; Vincent Conitzer (Games Econ. Behav., 2014)

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives. - Liad Wagman; Vincent Conitzer (Int. J. Game Theory, 2014)

Notes from the EC'14 program chairs. - Vincent Conitzer; David A. Easley (SIGecom Exch., 2014)

Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design. - Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Giuseppe Lopomo (AAAI, 2015)

Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy. - Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2015)

Cooperative Game Solution Concepts that Maximize Stability under Noise. - Yuqian Li; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2015)

Crowdsourcing Societal Tradeoffs. - Vincent Conitzer; Markus Brill; Rupert Freeman (AAMAS, 2015)

General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice. - Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2015)

Complexity of Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs. - Andrew Kephart; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2015)

Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks. - Catherine Moon; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2015)

A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists. - Vincent Conitzer (Synth., 2015)

Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs? - Vincent Conitzer (Synth., 2015)

Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility. - Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Giuseppe Lopomo (AAAI, 2016)

Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners). - Markus Brill; Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2016)

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Markus Brill; Yuqian Li (AAAI, 2016)

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract). - Catherine Moon; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2016)

Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games. - Haifeng Xu; Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer; Shaddin Dughmi; Milind Tambe (AAMAS, 2016)

ATUCAPTS: Automated Tests that a User Cannot Pass Twice Simultaneously. - Garrett Andersen; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2016)

Catcher-Evader Games. - Yuqian Li; Vincent Conitzer; Dmytro Korzhyk (IJCAI, 2016)

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation. - Catherine Moon; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2016)

Timeability of Extensive-Form Games. - Sune K. Jakobsen; Troels Bjerre Sørensen; Vincent Conitzer (ITCS, 2016)

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks. - Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (ISAIM, 2016)

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs. - Andrew Kephart; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2016)

Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment. - Vincent Conitzer (WINE, 2016)

Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence. - Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2016)

Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share. - Rupert Freeman; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2016)

On Stackelberg mixed strategies. - Vincent Conitzer (Synth., 2016)

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14. - Vincent Conitzer; David A. Easley (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016)

Introduction to Computational Social Choice. - Felix Brandt 001; Vincent Conitzer; Ulle Endriss; Jérôme Lang; Ariel D. Procaccia (Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016)

Barriers to Manipulation in Voting. - Vincent Conitzer; Toby Walsh (Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016)

Automated Design of Robust Mechanisms. - Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Peter Stone 001 (AAAI, 2017)

Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence. - Vincent Conitzer; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong; Jana Schaich Borg; Yuan Deng; Max Kramer 001 (AAAI Workshops, 2017)

Disarmament Games. - Yuan Deng; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2017)

Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated Distributions: Can We Learn Optimal Mechanisms? - Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Peter Stone 001 (AAMAS, 2017)

Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings. - Rupert Freeman; Seyed Majid Zahedi; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2017)

Fair Public Decision Making. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001 (EC, 2017)

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid. - Mathijs de Weerdt; Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2017)

Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests. - Yuqian Li; Vincent Conitzer (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2017)

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting. - Haris Aziz 001; Markus Brill; Vincent Conitzer; Edith Elkind; Rupert Freeman; Toby Walsh (Soc. Choice Welf., 2017)

Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future. - Vincent Conitzer; R. Preston McAfee (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017)

Disarmament Games With Resource. - Yuan Deng; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2018)

When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions? - Max F. Kramer; Jana Schaich Borg; Vincent Conitzer; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (AIES, 2018)

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid. - Mathijs de Weerdt; Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Koos van der Linden (IJCAI, 2018)

Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations. - Suguru Ueda; Atsushi Iwasaki; Vincent Conitzer; Naoki Ohta; Yuko Sakurai; Makoto Yokoo (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2018)

Technical perspective: Designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy. - Vincent Conitzer (Commun. ACM, 2018)

Can Artificial Intelligence Do Everything That We Can? - Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2018)

Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach. - Rupert Freeman; Seyed Majid Zahedi; Vincent Conitzer; Benjamin C. Lee (Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., 2018)

Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence. - Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2019)

Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods. - Vincent Conitzer; Rupert Freeman; Nisarg Shah 001; Jennifer Wortman Vaughan (AAAI, 2019)

A PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents' Judgments. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2019)

A Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2019)

When Samples Are Strategically Selected. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (ICML, 2019)

Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (NeurIPS, 2019)

The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. - Vincent Conitzer (Math. Oper. Res., 2019)

Puzzle: the AI circus: (puzzle in honor of Tuomas Sandholm's 50th birthday). - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2019)

Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making. - Lok Chan; Kenzie Doyle; Duncan C. McElfresh; Vincent Conitzer; John P. Dickerson; Jana Schaich Borg; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (AIES, 2020)

Learning Opinions in Social Networks. - Vincent Conitzer; Debmalya Panigrahi; Hanrui Zhang 001 (ICML, 2020)

Learning the Valuations of a k-demand Agent. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (ICML, 2020)

Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists. - Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (AISafety@IJCAI, 2020)

Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments. - Steven Jecmen; Hanrui Zhang 001; Ryan Liu 001; Nihar B. Shah; Vincent Conitzer; Fei Fang 001 (NeurIPS, 2020)

Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2020)

Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games. - Vincent Conitzer; Yuan Deng; Shaddin Dughmi (WINE, 2020)

Minimum-Regret Contracts for Principal-Expert Problems. - Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (WINE, 2020)

Decision Scoring Rules. - Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (WINE, 2020)

Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values. - Rachel Freedman; Jana Schaich Borg; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong; John P. Dickerson; Vincent Conitzer (Artif. Intell., 2020)

Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning. - Aaron M. Kolb; Vincent Conitzer (J. Econ. Theory, 2020)

Classification with Strategically Withheld Data. - Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy; Haoming Li 002; David Rein; Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2021)

Indecision Modeling. - Duncan C. McElfresh; Lok Chan; Kenzie Doyle; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong; Vincent Conitzer; Jana Schaich Borg; John P. Dickerson (AAAI, 2021)

Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2021)

Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2021)

Incentive-Aware PAC Learning. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2021)

Ethical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in In Vitro Fertilization. - Michael Anis Mihdi Afnan; Cynthia Rudin; Vincent Conitzer; Julian Savulescu; Abhishek Mishra; Yanhe Liu; Masoud Afnan (AIES, 2021)

Automated Mechanism Design for Strategic Classification: Abstract for KDD'21 Keynote Talk. - Vincent Conitzer (KDD, 2021)

Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (NeurIPS, 2021)

Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. - Vincent Conitzer; Zhe Feng 004; David C. Parkes; Eric Sodomka (WINE, 2021)

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs. - Andrew Kephart; Vincent Conitzer (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2021)

Learning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks. - Vincent Conitzer; Debmalya Panigrahi; Hanrui Zhang 001 (AAAI, 2022)

Planning with Participation Constraints. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2022)

Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design. - Steven Jecmen; Hanrui Zhang 001; Ryan Liu 001; Fei Fang 001; Vincent Conitzer; Nihar B. Shah (AAMAS, 2022)

For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria. - Scott Emmons; Caspar Oesterheld; Andrew Critch; Vincent Conitzer; Stuart Russell 001 (ICML, 2022)

Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2022)

Safe Pareto improvements for delegated game playing. - Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022)

Tradeoffs in Preventing Manipulation in Paper Bidding for Reviewer Assignment. - Steven Jecmen; Nihar B. Shah; Fei Fang 001; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2022)

Similarity-based Cooperation. - Caspar Oesterheld; Johannes Treutlein; Roger B. Grosse; Vincent Conitzer; Jakob N. Foerster (CoRR, 2022)

Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization. - Michael Albert 002; Vincent Conitzer; Giuseppe Lopomo; Peter Stone 001 (Oper. Res., 2022)

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets. - Vincent Conitzer; Christian Kroer; Eric Sodomka; Nicolás E. Stier Moses (Oper. Res., 2022)

Puzzle: communicating to plan noam nisan's 60th birthday workshop. - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2022)

Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets. - Vincent Conitzer; Christian Kroer; Debmalya Panigrahi; Okke Schrijvers; Nicolás E. Stier Moses; Eric Sodomka; Christopher A. Wilkens (Manag. Sci., 2022)

Foundations of Cooperative AI. - Vincent Conitzer; Caspar Oesterheld (AAAI, 2023)

Automated Moral Decision Making by Learning from Humans: Why and How (invited paper). - Vincent Conitzer (ETHAICS@IJCAI, 2023)

Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players. - Vojtech Kovarík; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2023)

The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games. - Emanuel Tewolde; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer; Paul W. Goldberg (IJCAI, 2023)

Similarity-based cooperative equilibrium. - Caspar Oesterheld; Johannes Treutlein; Roger B. Grosse; Vincent Conitzer; Jakob N. Foerster (NeurIPS, 2023)

Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen McAleer; Andreas A. Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (NeurIPS, 2023)

Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation. - Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (EC, 2023)

A Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review. - Steven Jecmen; Minji Yoon; Vincent Conitzer; Nihar B. Shah; Fei Fang 001 (WWW, 2023)

Technical Perspective: The Impact of Auditing for Algorithmic Bias. - Vincent Conitzer; Gillian K. Hadfield; Shannon Vallor (Commun. ACM, 2023)

Steering No-Regret Learners to Optimal Equilibria. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen Marcus McAleer; Andreas Alexander Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (CoRR, 2023)

A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality. - Caspar Oesterheld; Abram Demski; Vincent Conitzer (TARK, 2023)

Testing for Reviewer Anchoring in Peer Review: A Randomized Controlled Trial. - Ryan Liu 001; Steven Jecmen; Vincent Conitzer; Fei Fang 001; Nihar B. Shah (CoRR, 2023)

Puzzle: Does Occasional Simulation Enable Cooperation? (Puzzle in Honor of Joe Halpern's 70th Birthday). - Vincent Conitzer (SIGecom Exch., 2023)

The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games. - Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2024)

Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups. - Yixuan Even Xu; Hanrui Zhang 001; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2024)

On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods. - Kyle Boerstler; Vijay Keswani; Lok Chan; Jana Schaich Borg; Vincent Conitzer; Hoda Heidari; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (AIES (1), 2024)

On the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation. - Vijay Keswani; Vincent Conitzer; Hoda Heidari; Jana Schaich Borg; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (AIES (1), 2024)

Position: Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback. - Vincent Conitzer; Rachel Freedman; Jobst Heitzig; Wesley H. Holliday; Bob M. Jacobs; Nathan Lambert 001; Milan Mossé; Eric Pacuit; Stuart Russell 001; Hailey Schoelkopf; Emanuel Tewolde; William S. Zwicker (ICML, 2024)

Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts. - Ratip Emin Berker; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2024)

Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets. - Emanuel Tewolde; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2024)

Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity. - Emanuel Tewolde; Brian Hu Zhang; Caspar Oesterheld; Manolis Zampetakis; Tuomas Sandholm; Paul Goldberg 001; Vincent Conitzer (IJCAI, 2024)

Melting Pot Contest: Charting the Future of Generalized Cooperative Intelligence. - Rakshit Trivedi; Akbir Khan; Jesse Clifton; Lewis Hammond; Edgar A. Duéñez-Guzmán; Dipam Chakraborty; John P. Agapiou; Jayd Matyas; Alexander Sasha Vezhnevets; Barna Pásztor; Yunke Ao; Omar G. Younis; et al. (NeurIPS, 2024)

Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction. - Yixuan Xu; Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (NeurIPS, 2024)

Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium. - Brian Hu Zhang; Gabriele Farina; Ioannis Anagnostides; Federico Cacciamani; Stephen McAleer; Andreas A. Haupt; Andrea Celli; Nicola Gatti 001; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2024)

Recursive Joint Simulation in Games. - Vojtech Kovarík; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2024)

Now, Later, and Lasting: Ten Priorities for AI Research, Policy, and Practice. - Eric Horvitz; Vincent Conitzer; Sheila A. McIlraith; Peter Stone 001 (CoRR, 2024)

Social Choice for AI Alignment: Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback. - Vincent Conitzer; Rachel Freedman; Jobst Heitzig; Wesley H. Holliday; Bob M. Jacobs; Nathan Lambert 001; Milan Mossé; Eric Pacuit; Stuart Russell 001; Hailey Schoelkopf; Emanuel Tewolde; William S. Zwicker (CoRR, 2024)

Why should we ever automate moral decision making? - Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2024)

Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction. - Yixuan Even Xu; Hanrui Zhang 001; Yu Cheng 002; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2024)

Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics? - Emery Cooper; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2024)

Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games. - Scott Emmons; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer; Stuart Russell 001 (CoRR, 2024)

Now, Later, and Lasting: 10 Priorities for AI Research, Policy, and Practice. - Eric Horvitz; Vincent Conitzer; Sheila A. McIlraith; Peter Stone 001 (Commun. ACM, 2024)

The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games. - Ratip Emin Berker; Emanuel Tewolde; Ioannis Anagnostides; Tuomas Sandholm; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2025)

Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria. - Emery Cooper; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2025)

Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them. - Emanuel Tewolde; Brian Hu Zhang; Caspar Oesterheld; Tuomas Sandholm; Vincent Conitzer (AAAI, 2025)

Can AI Model the Complexities of Human Moral Decision-making? A Qualitative Study of Kidney Allocation Decisions. - Vijay Keswani; Vincent Conitzer; Walter Sinnott-Armstrong; Breanna K. Nguyen; Hoda Heidari; Jana Schaich Borg (CHI, 2025)

Game Theory with Simulation in the Presence of Unpredictable Randomisation. - Vojtech Kovarík; Nathaniel Sauerberg; Lewis Hammond; Vincent Conitzer (AAMAS, 2025)

From Independence of Clones to Composition Consistency: A Hierarchy of Barriers to Strategic Nomination. - Ratip Emin Berker; Sílvia Casacuberta; Isaac Robinson; Christopher Ong; Vincent Conitzer; Edith Elkind (EC, 2025)

Learning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability. - Brian Hu Zhang; Ioannis Anagnostides; Emanuel Tewolde; Ratip Emin Berker; Gabriele Farina; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (EC, 2025)

An Interpretable Automated Mechanism Design Framework with Large Language Models. - Jiayuan Liu; Mingyu Guo; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2025)

Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI. - Lewis Hammond; Alan Chan; Jesse Clifton; Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier; Akbir Khan; Euan McLean; Chandler Smith; Wolfram Barfuss; Jakob N. Foerster; Tomas Gavenciak; The Anh Han; Edward Hughes 001; et al. (CoRR, 2025)

Expected Variational Inequalities. - Brian Hu Zhang; Ioannis Anagnostides; Emanuel Tewolde; Ratip Emin Berker; Gabriele Farina; Vincent Conitzer; Tuomas Sandholm (CoRR, 2025)

Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments. - Ivan Geffner; Caspar Oesterheld; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2025)

AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour. - Vojtech Kovarík; Eric Olav Chen; Sami Petersen; Alexis Ghersengorin; Vincent Conitzer (CoRR, 2025)