Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets. - Weiwei Wu 001; Xiang Liu 014; Minming Li (IJCAI, 2018)

Two-sided Auctions with Budgets: Fairness, Incentives and Efficiency. - Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001; Minming Li; Wanyuan Wang (AAMAS, 2020)

Budget Feasible Mechanisms Over Graphs. - Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001; Minming Li; Wanyuan Wang (AAAI, 2021)

Budget-feasible Mechanisms for Representing Groups of Agents Proportionally. - Xiang Liu 014; Hau Chan; Minming Li; Weiwei Wu 001 (IJCAI, 2021)

Revenue Maximization of Electric Vehicle Charging Services with Hierarchical Game. - Biwei Wu; Xiaoxuan Zhu; Xiang Liu 014; Jiahui Jin; Runqun Xiong; Weiwei Wu 001 (WASA (2), 2021)

Master Multiple Real-Time Strategy Games with a Unified Learning Model Using Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning. - Bo Ling; Xiang Liu 014; Jin Jiang; Weiwei Wu 001; Wanyuan Wang; Yan Lyu; Xueyong Xu (NCAA (2), 2022)

Network-Flow-Based Efficient Vehicle Dispatch for City-Scale Ride-Hailing Systems. - Yuhang Xu; Wanyuan Wang; Guangwei Xiong; Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001; Kai Liu 001 (IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst., 2022)

Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing. - Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001; Wanyuan Wang; Yuhang Xu; Xiumin Wang; Helei Cui (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2023)

Budget-feasible mechanisms for proportionally selecting agents from groups. - Xiang Liu 014; Hau Chan; Minming Li; Weiwei Wu 001; Yingchao Zhao 001 (Artif. Intell., 2023)

Budget-Feasible Mechanisms in Two-Sided Crowdsensing Markets: Truthfulness, Fairness, and Efficiency. - Xiang Liu 014; Chenchen Fu; Weiwei Wu 001; Minming Li; Wanyuan Wang; Vincent Chau; Junzhou Luo (IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput., 2023)

Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey. - Xiang Liu 014; Hau Chan; Minming Li; Weiwei Wu 001 (IJCAI, 2024)

Congestion-aware Stackelberg pricing game in urban Internet-of-Things networks: A case study. - Jiahui Jin; Zhendong Guo; Wenchao Bai; Biwei Wu; Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001 (Comput. Networks, 2024)

Communication-Topology-preserving Motion Planning: Enabling Static Routing in UAV Networks. - Ziyao Huang 001; Weiwei Wu 001; Chenchen Fu; Xiang Liu 014; Feng Shan; Jianping Wang 001; Xueyong Xu (ACM Trans. Sens. Networks, 2024)

B2-Bandit: Budgeted Pricing With Blocking Constraints for Metaverse Crowdsensing Under Uncertainty. - Xiang Liu 014; Yifan Qin; Weiwei Wu 001; Chenchen Fu; Yan Lyu; Fang Dong 001; Junzhou Luo (IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2024)

AoI-Guaranteed Bandit: Information Gathering Over Unreliable Channels. - Ziyao Huang 001; Weiwei Wu 001; Chenchen Fu; Vincent Chau; Xiang Liu 014; Jianping Wang 001; Junzhou Luo (IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput., 2024)

Non-stochastic Budgeted Online Pricing with Semi-Bandit Feedback. - Xiang Liu 014; Hau Chan; Minming Li; Weiwei Wu 001; Long Tran-Thanh (AAAI, 2025)

CARE: Compatibility-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Federated Learning with Budgeted Requesters. - Xiang Liu 014; Hau Chan; Minming Li; Xianlong Zeng; Chenchen Fu; Weiwei Wu 001 (INFOCOM, 2025)

Minimizing Age of Event in Artificial Intelligence of Things. - Ziyao Huang 001; Weiwei Wu 001; Vincent Chau; Kui Wu 001; Xiang Liu 014; Jianping Wang 001 (ACM Trans. Sens. Networks, 2025)

Budget-Feasible Diffusion Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsourcing in Social Networks. - Xiang Liu 014; Weiwei Wu 001; Minming Li; Wanyuan Wang; Yifan Qin; Yingchao Zhao 001; Junzhou Luo (IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput., 2025)