Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Alexandros Psomas 001; Xizhi Tan (AAAI, 2021)

Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Kostas Kollias; Alkmini Sgouritsa; Xizhi Tan (EC, 2022)

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. - Eric Balkanski; Pranav Garimidi; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Xizhi Tan (SODA, 2022)

EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare. - Marius Garbea; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan (ECAI, 2023)

Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. - Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan (ITCS, 2023)

Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. - Ben Berger; Michal Feldman; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan (CoRR, 2023)

Mechanism Design with Predictions: An Annotated Reading List. - Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan (SIGecom Exch., 2023)

Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Alexandros Psomas 001; Xizhi Tan; Paritosh Verma (IJCAI, 2024)

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. - Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan; Cherlin Zhu (EC, 2024)

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p, q)-Veto Core. - Ben Berger; Michal Feldman; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Xizhi Tan (EC, 2024)

Extracting Small Subgraphs in Road Networks. - Sara Ahmadian; Sreenivas Gollapudi; Gregory Hutchins; Kostas Kollias; Xizhi Tan (WWW, 2024)

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. - Priyank Agrawal; Eric Balkanski; Vasilis Gkatzelis; Tingting Ou; Xizhi Tan (Math. Oper. Res., 2024)

Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. - Vasilis Gkatzelis; Daniel Schoepflin 001; Xizhi Tan (SODA, 2025)

Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions. - Gagan Aggarwal; Anupam Gupta 001; Xizhi Tan; Mingfei Zhao (WWW, 2025)