Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria. - Yakov Babichenko (Int. J. Game Theory, 2010)

Oblivious Collaboration. - Yehuda Afek; Yakov Babichenko; Uriel Feige; Eli Gafni; Nati Linial; Benny Sudakov (DISC, 2011)

Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. - Yakov Babichenko (Games Econ. Behav., 2012)

Average testing and Pareto efficiency. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2012)

Small-Support Approximate Correlated Equilibria. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman; Ron Peretz (CoRR, 2013)

Approximate Nash Equilibria via Sampling. - Yakov Babichenko; Ron Peretz (CoRR, 2013)

Small Support Equilibria in Large Games - Yakov Babichenko (CoRR, 2013)

Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games. - Yakov Babichenko (Games Econ. Behav., 2013)

Simple approximate equilibria in large games. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman; Ron Peretz (EC, 2014)

Axiomatic Approach to Solutions of Games. - Yakov Babichenko (CoRR, 2014)

How long to Pareto efficiency? - Yakov Babichenko (Int. J. Game Theory, 2014)

Musical Chairs. - Yehuda Afek; Yakov Babichenko; Uriel Feige; Eli Gafni; Nati Linial; Benny Sudakov (SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2014)

Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (CoRR, 2015)

Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash. - Yakov Babichenko; Christos H. Papadimitriou; Aviad Rubinstein (CoRR, 2015)

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015)

Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? - Yakov Babichenko; Christos H. Papadimitriou; Aviad Rubinstein (ITCS, 2016)

Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman (CoRR, 2016)

Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. - Yakov Babichenko (J. ACM, 2016)

Random extensive form games. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2016)

Graphical potential games. - Yakov Babichenko; Omer Tamuz (J. Econ. Theory, 2016)

Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman (ITCS, 2017)

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (EC, 2017)

Forecast Aggregation. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky (EC, 2017)

Sequential commitment games. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Moshe Tennenholtz (Games Econ. Behav., 2017)

Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application. - Yakov Babichenko; Siddharth Barman; Ron Peretz (Math. Oper. Res., 2017)

Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. - Yakov Babichenko; Oren Dean; Moshe Tennenholtz (WWW, 2018)

Paradoxes in Sequential Voting. - Oren Dean; Yakov Babichenko; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2018)

Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games. - Yakov Babichenko (Math. Oper. Res., 2018)

Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (EC, 2019)

Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Segev Shlomov (EC, 2019)

The communication complexity of local search. - Yakov Babichenko; Shahar Dobzinski; Noam Nisan (STOC, 2019)

Stable Secretaries. - Yakov Babichenko; Yuval Emek; Michal Feldman; Boaz Patt-Shamir; Ron Peretz; Rann Smorodinsky (Algorithmica, 2019)

Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network. - Yakov Babichenko; Oren Dean; Moshe Tennenholtz (TARK, 2019)

Private Bayesian persuasion. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2019)

Informational bounds on equilibria (a survey). - Yakov Babichenko (SIGecom Exch., 2019)

Incentive-Compatible Classification. - Yakov Babichenko; Oren Dean; Moshe Tennenholtz (AAAI, 2020)

Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games (extended abstract). - Yakov Babichenko; Aviad Rubinstein (FOCS, 2020)

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz (EC, 2020)

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky; Takuro Yamashita (EC, 2020)

Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. - Yakov Babichenko; Oren Dean; Moshe Tennenholtz (EC, 2020)

Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games. - Yakov Babichenko; Aviad Rubinstein (CoRR, 2020)

Identifiable information structures. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Rann Smorodinsky (Games Econ. Behav., 2020)

Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Konstantin Zabarnyi (AAAI, 2021)

Sequential Naive Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (EC, 2021)

Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games. - Yakov Babichenko; Aviad Rubinstein (STOC, 2021)

Virtually additive learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Segev Shlomov (J. Econ. Theory, 2021)

Learning Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments. - Yakov Babichenko; Dan Garber (Math. Oper. Res., 2021)

Robust learning in social networks via matrix scaling. - Yakov Babichenko; Segev Shlomov (Oper. Res. Lett., 2021)

Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy; Omer Tamuz (SIGecom Exch., 2021)

Golden games. - Urban Larsson; Yakov Babichenko (Theor. Comput. Sci., 2021)

Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (ITCS, 2022)

Persuasion as Transportation. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (EC, 2022)

Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (CoRR, 2022)

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. - Yakov Babichenko; Aviad Rubinstein (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (Games Econ. Behav., 2022)

Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Manuel Mueller-Frank (Oper. Res., 2022)

The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Stephan Müller; Farzad Pourbabaee; Omer Tamuz (EC, 2023)

Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2023)

Algorithmic Cheap Talk. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2024)

Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. - Yakov Babichenko; Inbal Talgam-Cohen; Haifeng Xu; Konstantin Zabarnyi (EC, 2024)

Fair Division via Quantile Shares. - Yakov Babichenko; Michal Feldman; Ron Holzman; Vishnu V. Narayan (STOC, 2024)

Robust Price Discrimination. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Omer Madmon; Moshe Tennenholtz (CoRR, 2024)

Persuading while Learning. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Dimitry Shaiderman; Xianwen Shi (CoRR, 2024)

A population's feasible posterior beliefs. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko (J. Econ. Theory, 2024)

Constructive Blackwell's Theorem. - Itai Arieli; Yakov Babichenko; Fedor Sandomirskiy (EC, 2025)