The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria. - Yannick Viossat (Games Econ. Behav., 2007)

Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium. - Yannick Viossat (Math. Soc. Sci., 2008)

Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics. - Josef Hofbauer; Sylvain Sorin; Yannick Viossat (Math. Oper. Res., 2009)

Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria - Yannick Viossat (CoRR, 2012)

No-regret dynamics and fictitious play. - Yannick Viossat; Andriy Zapechelnyuk (J. Econ. Theory, 2013)

Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks. - Panayotis Mertikopoulos; Yannick Viossat (Int. J. Game Theory, 2016)

Semi-algebraic sets and equilibria of binary games. - Guillaume Vigeral; Yannick Viossat (Oper. Res. Lett., 2016)

I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions. - Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Yevgeny Tsodikovich; Yannick Viossat (CoRR, 2021)

Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics. - Panayotis Mertikopoulos; Yannick Viossat (CoRR, 2022)