VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis. - Yotam Gafni; Ron Lavi; Moshe Tennenholtz (AAAI, 2020)

Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. - Yotam Gafni; Ron Lavi; Moshe Tennenholtz (IJCAI, 2021)

Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation. - Yotam Gafni; Ron Lavi; Moshe Tennenholtz (J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2021)

Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks. - Yotam Gafni; Moshe Tennenholtz (EC, 2022)

Greedy Transaction Fee Mechanisms for (Non-)myopic Miners. - Yotam Gafni; Aviv Yaish (CoRR, 2022)

From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. - Xiaotie Deng; Yotam Gafni; Ron Lavi; Tao Lin 013; Hongyi Ling (AAAI, 2023)

Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions. - Yotam Gafni; Moshe Tennenholtz (TARK, 2023)

Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. - Yotam Gafni; Xin Huang; Ron Lavi; Inbal Talgam-Cohen (ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2023)

Discrete and Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms. - Yotam Gafni; Aviv Yaish (MARBLE, 2024)

Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference. - Yotam Gafni; Ronen Gradwohl; Moshe Tennenholtz (SAGT, 2024)

Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms. - Yotam Gafni; Aviv Yaish (EC, 2024)

Competitive Revenue Extraction from Time-Discounted Transactions in the Semi-Myopic Regime. - Yotam Gafni; Aviv Yaish (CoRR, 2024)

Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting. - Yotam Gafni; Ben Golan (CoRR, 2024)

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices. - Matheus V. X. Ferreira; Yotam Gafni; Max Resnick (CoRR, 2024)

From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? - Xiaotie Deng; Yotam Gafni; Ron Lavi; Tao Lin 013; Hongyi Ling (Games Econ. Behav., 2025)

Envious Explore and Exploit. - Omer Ben-Porat; Yotam Gafni; Or Markovetzki (CoRR, 2025)