Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders. - Yang Cai 001; Ziyun Chen 001; Jinzhao Wu (FOCS, 2023)

Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions. - Ziyun Chen 001; Zhiyi Huang 002; Dorsa Majdi; Zipeng Yan (EC, 2023)

Stochastic Online Correlated Selection. - Ziyun Chen 001; Zhiyi Huang 002; Enze Sun 001 (FOCS, 2024)

Prophet Secretary and Matching: the Significance of the Largest Item. - Ziyun Chen 001; Zhiyi Huang 002; Dongchen Li; Zhihao Gavin Tang (SODA, 2025)

High-Accuracy List-Decodable Mean Estimation. - Ziyun Chen 001; Spencer Compton; Daniel M. Kane; Jerry Li 001 (STOC, 2026)

Separating Oblivious and Adaptive Models of Variable Selection. - Ziyun Chen 001; Jerry Li 001; Kevin Tian; Yusong Zhu (CoRR, 2026)