The effectiveness of English auctions. - Zvika Neeman (Games Econ. Behav., 2003)

The relevance of private information in mechanism design. - Zvika Neeman (J. Econ. Theory, 2004)

Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation. - Tamar Kugler; Zvika Neeman; Nir Vulkan (Games Econ. Behav., 2006)

Robustness against inefficient manipulation. - Eyal Baharad; Zvika Neeman (Soc. Choice Welf., 2007)

Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design. - Zvika Neeman; Gregory Pavlov (J. Econ. Theory, 2013)

The rarity of consistent aggregators. - Eyal Baharad; Zvika Neeman; Anna Rubinchik (Math. Soc. Sci., 2020)

Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections. - Ran Eilat; Zvika Neeman; Eilon Solan (EC, 2023)

Communication with endogenous deception costs. - Ran Eilat; Zvika Neeman (J. Econ. Theory, 2023)

Markovian persuasion with two states. - Galit Ashkenazi-Golan; Penélope Hernández; Zvika Neeman; Eilon Solan (Games Econ. Behav., 2023)