Drew Fudenberg

Ying Gao

Harry Pei

J. Econ. Theory, 2022

Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel Clark

Kevin He

J. Econ. Theory, 2022

Intervention with limited information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Int. J. Game Theory, 2022

2021

Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kevin He

J. Econ. Theory, 2021

Working to learn.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

George Georgiadis

Luis Rayo

J. Econ. Theory, 2021

How Flexible is that Functional Form?: Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wayne Gao

Annie Liang

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

2020

Machine learning for evaluating and improving theories.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Annie Liang

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Payoff information and learning in signaling games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kevin He

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wayne Gao

Annie Liang

CoRR, 2020

2019

Measuring the Completeness of Theories.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

2018

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuichiro Kamada

Games Econ. Behav., 2018

2017

"I'm just a soul whose intentions are good": The role of communication in noisy repeated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2017

2016

Recency, Records, and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexander Peysakhovich

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2016

2014

Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuhta Ishii

Scott Duke Kominers

J. Econ. Theory, 2014

Recency, records and recaps: learning and non-equilibrium behavior in a simple decision problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexander Peysakhovich

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2011

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuichi Yamamoto

J. Econ. Theory, 2011

The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuichi Yamamoto

J. Econ. Theory, 2011

Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Satoru Takahashi

Games Econ. Behav., 2011

Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Wojciech Olszewski

Games Econ. Behav., 2011

2010

Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert M. Anderson

Games Econ. Behav., 2010

2009

Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2009

Random matching in adaptive dynamics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

2008

Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2008

When is reputation bad?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jeffrey C. Ely

Games Econ. Behav., 2008

2007

Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Markus Mobius

Adam Szeidl

J. Econ. Theory, 2007

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2007

Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Satoru Takahashi

Games Econ. Behav., 2007

An economist's perspective on multi-agent learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2007

2006

Imitation processes with small mutations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2006

2004

Learning to play Bayesian games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eddie Dekel

Games Econ. Behav., 2004

Word-of-mouth learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Abhijit Banerjee

Games Econ. Behav., 2004

2002

Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eddie Dekel

J. Econ. Theory, 2002

2000

Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2000

1991

Game theory (3. pr.).

[BibT_eX]