Jing Chen

Affiliations:
  • Stony Brook University, Computer Science Department, NY, USA
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA (PhD 2012)


According to our database1, Jing Chen authored at least 19 papers between 2009 and 2019.

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Bibliography

2019
Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 2019

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs.
Proceedings of the 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2019

2018
ALGORAND AGREEMENT: Super Fast and Partition Resilient Byzantine Agreement.
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2018

Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

2017
Rational Proofs with Non-Cooperative Provers.
CoRR, 2017

2016
Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare.
Math. Oper. Res., 2016

Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions.
Games, 2016

Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

2015
Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs.
J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Better Outcomes from More Rationality.
Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2015

2012
Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs.
PhD thesis, 2012

Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness.
J. Econ. Theory, 2012

Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science 2012, 2012

2011
Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs.
Proceedings of the IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2011

Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - (Abstract).
Proceedings of the Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, 2011

2010
Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

2009
A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design.
Proceedings of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2009


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