Jing Chen

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

2019

Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2019

Efficient Approximations for the Online Dispersion Problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2019

Maximin-Aware Allocations of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2019

2018

ALGORAND AGREEMENT: Super Fast and Partition Resilient Byzantine Agreement.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2018

Efficient Rational Proofs with Strong Utility-Gap Guarantees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

Information Elicitation for Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 11th International Symposium, 2018

Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2018

2017

Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gowtham Srinivasan

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017

Rational Proofs with Non-Cooperative Provers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

2016

Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mark Braverman

Sampath Kannan

Math. Oper. Res., 2016

Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games, 2016

Auction Revenue in the General Spiteful-Utility Model.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Dealers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

2015

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Better Outcomes from More Rationality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rafael Pass

Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2015

2014

Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, 2014

2012

Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2012

Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2012

Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pablo Azar

Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science 2012, 2012

2011

Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2011

Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions - (Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pablo Daniel Azar

Proceedings of the Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications, 2011

2010

Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul Valiant

Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Avinatan Hassidim

Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

2009

A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]