László Á. Kóczy

Orcid: 0000-0002-8588-6140

Affiliations:
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest, Hungary
  • Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Finance, Budapest, Hungary
  • Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, Budapest, Hungary
  • Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics, Budapest, Hungary
  • Maastricht University, Department of Economics, Maastricht, The Netherlands
  • KU Leuven, Center for Economic Studies, Leuven, Belgium (PhD 2003)


According to our database1, László Á. Kóczy authored at least 18 papers between 2004 and 2022.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of five.
  • Erdős number3 of four.

Timeline

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Bibliography

2022
Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council.
Games, 2022

Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities.
Ann. Oper. Res., 2022

2021
Computing power indices for weighted voting games via dynamic programming.
Oper. Res. Decis., 2021

The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games.
Games Econ. Behav., 2021

Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union.
Games, 2021

2018
Bounds on Malapportionment.
Oper. Res. Lett., 2018

2015
Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2015

Editorial.
Central Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2015

2013
Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2013

2012
Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2012

2011
Balancedness conditions for exact games.
Math. Methods Oper. Res., 2011

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility.
Eur. J. Oper. Res., 2011

2009
Measuring Voting Power: The Paradox of New Members vs. the Null Player Axiom.
Proceedings of the Towards Intelligent Engineering and Information Technology, 2009

The invariant method can be manipulated.
Scientometrics, 2009

Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Stable allocations of risk.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

2007
The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension.
Games Econ. Behav., 2007

2004
The coalition structure core is accessible.
Games Econ. Behav., 2004


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