According to our database1, Françoise Forges authored at least 18 papers between 1988 and 2020.
Legend:Book In proceedings Article PhD thesis Other
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval.
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue.
Games Econ. Behav., 2017
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2016
Bayesian repeated games and reputation.
J. Economic Theory, 2015
Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406].
J. Economic Theory, 2014
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: some Open Problems.
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment.
Games Econ. Behav., 2013
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values.
Games Econ. Behav., 2011
Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games.
Proceedings of the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets.
J. Economic Theory, 2009
Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity.
Math. Oper. Res., 2008
Long persuasion games.
J. Economic Theory, 2008
Multistage Communication with and without Verifiable Types.
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2006
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core.
J. Economic Theory, 2001
Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission.
Proceedings of the Essays in Game Theory, In Honor of Michael Maschler, 1994
Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.
Math. Oper. Res., 1988