Abheek Ghosh

Orcid: 0000-0002-4771-4612

According to our database1, Abheek Ghosh authored at least 16 papers between 2018 and 2026.

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Bibliography

2026
The Complexity of Sparse Win-Lose Bimatrix Games.
CoRR, February, 2026

Computing Equilibrium Points of Electrostatic Potentials.
Proceedings of the 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2026

2025
Fraud-Proof Revenue Division on Subscription Platforms.
Proceedings of the Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning, 2025

2024
Persuading a Credible Agent.
CoRR, 2024

Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs.
CoRR, 2024

The Complexity of Symmetric Bimatrix Games with Common Payoffs.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 20th International Conference, 2024

2023
Best-Response Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs.
CoRR, 2023

Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Indexability is Not Enough for Whittle: Improved, Near-Optimal Algorithms for Restless Bandits.
Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Contests and Other Topics in Multi-Agent Systems.
Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

2022
Simultaneous Contests with Equal Sharing Allocation of Prizes: Computational Complexity and Price of Anarchy.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

Contests to Incentivize a Target Group.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Complexity of Deliberative Coalition Formation.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

2018
On the Welfare of Cardinal Voting Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the 38th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, 2018

Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Multi-Winner Elections.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018


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