Alberto Marchesi

CoRR, May, 2026

Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, May, 2026

Toward Optimal Regret in Robust Pricing: Decoupling Corruption and Time.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kalana Kalupahana

CoRR, May, 2026

Multi-Armed Bandits With Best-Action Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, May, 2026

Replicable Constrained Bandits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Matteo Bollini

Gianmarco Genalti

CoRR, February, 2026

Truly Adapting to Adversarial Constraints in Constrained MABs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, February, 2026

A Stronger Benchmark for Online Bilateral Trade: From Fixed Prices to Distributions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, February, 2026

Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Types.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Matteo Bollini

Samuel Coutts

CoRR, February, 2026

The Sample Complexity of Uniform Approximation for Multi-dimensional CDFs and Fixed-Price Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 58th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2026

Better Regret Rates in Bilateral Trade via Sublinear Budget Violation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2026 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2026

2025

Beyond Slater's Condition in Online CMDPs with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eleonora Fidelia Chiefari

CoRR, September, 2025

Data-Dependent Regret Bounds for Constrained MABs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gianmarco Genalti

CoRR, May, 2025

Online Two-Sided Markets: Many Buyers Enhance Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, March, 2025

Online learning in sequential Bayesian persuasion: Handling unknown priors.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2025

Learning optimal contracts with small action spaces.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2025

Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2025

No-Regret Learning Under Adversarial Resource Constraints: A Spending Plan Is All You Need!

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2025, 2025

Online Bilateral Trade With Minimal Feedback: Don't Waste Seller's Time.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Roberto Colomboni

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2025, 2025

Policy Optimization for CMDPs with Bandit Feedback: Learning Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning, 2025

Learning Adversarial MDPs with Stochastic Hard Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning, 2025

Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning, 2025

Optimal Strong Regret and Violation in Constrained MDPs via Policy Optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations, 2025

The Sample Complexity of Stackelberg Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2025

2024

Contracting With a Reinforcement Learning Agent by Playing Trick or Treat.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Matteo Bollini

CoRR, 2024

Best-of-Both-Worlds Policy Optimization for CMDPs with Bandit Feedback.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Learning Constrained Markov Decision Processes With Non-stationary Rewards and Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

CoRR, 2024

Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, 2024

Online Learning in CMDPs: Handling Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, 2024

Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations, 2024

Finding Effective Ad Allocations: How to Exploit User History.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Learning Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Sequential Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

Francesco Trovò

Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2024

2023

Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., October, 2023

A Best-of-Both-Worlds Algorithm for Constrained MDPs with Long-Term Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jacopo Germano

CoRR, 2023

Selling Information while Being an Interested Party.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giulia Romano

CoRR, 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: Handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Persuading Farsighted Receivers in MDPs: the Power of Honesty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Constrained Phi-Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

2022

Simple Uncoupled No-regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2022

Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

Francesco Trovò

CoRR, 2022

Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Safe Learning in Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making: Handling Hard and Soft Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

Signaling in Posted Price Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2021

Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi de Luca

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Exploiting Opponents Under Utility Constraints in Sequential Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 34: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2021, 2021

Decentralized No-regret Learning Algorithms for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibria (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Trembling-Hand Perfection and Correlation in Sequential Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Leadership games: multiple followers, multiple leaders, and perfection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2020

A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mario Gilli

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

EURO J. Comput. Optim., 2020

No-regret learning dynamics for extensive-form correlated and coarse correlated equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Computing a Pessimistic Stackelberg Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: The Mixed-Pure Case.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2020

No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Learning Probably Approximately Correct Maximin Strategies in Simulation-Based Games with Infinite Strategy Spaces.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Francesco Trovò

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

2019

Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions (Extended Version).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders (Extended Version).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2019

Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, 2019

Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018

Learning dynamics in limited-control repeated games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrea Celli

Intelligenza Artificiale, 2018

Computing a Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: the Mixed-Pure Case.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giuseppe De Nittis

CoRR, 2018

Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giuseppe De Nittis

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Bilevel Programming Approaches to the Computation of Optimistic and Pessimistic Single-Leader-Multi-Follower Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 16th International Symposium on Experimental Algorithms, 2017

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium Reoptimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Andrea Celli

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]