Matteo Castiglioni

CoRR, 2024

Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

CoRR, 2024

Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

CoRR, 2024

Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Francesco Emanuele Stradi

CoRR, 2024

2023

Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., October, 2023

Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, September, 2023

Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., May, 2023

A framework for safe decision making: A convex duality approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martino Bernasconi

Federico Cacciamani

Intelligenza Artificiale, 2023

No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balance.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Federico Cacciamani

Francesco Emanuele Stradi

CoRR, 2023

Bandits with Replenishable Knapsacks: the Best of both Worlds.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

A Best-of-Both-Worlds Algorithm for Constrained MDPs with Long-Term Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jacopo Germano

CoRR, 2023

Online Bidding in Repeated Non-Truthful Auctions under Budget and ROI Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christian Kroer

CoRR, 2023

Selling Information while Being an Interested Party.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Giulia Romano

CoRR, 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: Handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2023

Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Persuading Farsighted Receivers in MDPs: the Power of Honesty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Federico Cacciamani

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

Constrained Phi-Equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

2022

Reducing the gap between theory and applications in algorithmic Bayesian persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2022

Safe Online Bid Optimization with Return-On-Investment and Budget Constraints subject to Uncertainty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2022

A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Safe Learning in Tree-Form Sequential Decision Making: Handling Hard and Soft Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

Online Learning with Knapsacks: the Best of Both Worlds.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christian Kroer

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

Signaling in Posted Price Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2021

Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2021

Multi-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Persuading Voters in District-based Elections.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Election Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates Extended Abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Trustworthy AI - Integrating Learning, Optimization and Reasoning, 2020

Online Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, 2020

Election Control in Social Networks via Edge Addition or Removal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Diodato Ferraioli

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

Persuading Voters: It's Easy to Whisper, It's Hard to Speak Loud.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions (Extended Version).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders (Extended Version).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Election Manipulation on Social Networks with Messages on Multiple Candidates.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Leadership in singleton congestion games: What is hard and what is easy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2019

Leadership in Congestion Games: Multiple User Classes and Non-Singleton Actions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Be a Leader or Become a Follower: The Strategy to Commit to with Multiple Leaders.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]