Clayton Thomas

According to our database, Clayton Thomas authored at least 21 papers between 2017 and 2026.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of three.
• Erdős number of three.

2026

Existence of Fair Resolute Voting Rules.

Manik Dhar, Kunal Mittal, Clayton Thomas

CoRR, February, 2026

Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms.

Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 17th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2026

2025

Algorithmic and Structural Complexities of Menus in Unit-Demand Auctions.

Daniel Schoepflin, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 21st International Conference, 2025

Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices.

Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 66th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2025

2024

Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices Are Not Distributive.

Clayton Thomas

CoRR, 2024

Structural Complexities of Matching Mechanisms.

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024

Describing Deferred Acceptance and Strategyproofness to Participants: Experimental Analysis.

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Guy Ishai, Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.

Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang

Proceedings of the 65th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2024

2023

Explainable Mechanism Design

Clayton Thomas

PhD thesis, 2023

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz, Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

2022

On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Clayton Thomas

CoRR, 2022

The Short-Side Advantage in Random Matching Markets.

Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2022

2021

Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness.

Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable.

Clayton Thomas

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity.

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

2020

Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof.

Clayton Thomas

CoRR, 2020

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity.

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Clayton Thomas, Geng Zhao

CoRR, 2020

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard.

Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

2019

Representing All Stable Matchings by Walking a Maximal Chain.

Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas

CoRR, 2019

2017

Maximally recoverable codes: The bounded case.

Venkata Gandikota, Elena Grigorescu, Clayton Thomas, Minshen Zhu

Proceedings of the 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2017