Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Orcid: 0000-0002-7887-0490

According to our database1, Yannai A. Gonczarowski authored at least 45 papers between 2012 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of three.
  • Erdős number3 of two.

Timeline

Legend:

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PhD thesis 
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Bibliography

2024
Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields.
CoRR, 2024

Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem.
CoRR, 2024

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation.
Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

2023
Common Knowledge, Regained.
CoRR, 2023

Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms.
CoRR, 2023

Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

The Distortion of Binomial Voting Defies Expectation.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

2022
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation.
Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Unbeatable consensus.
Distributed Comput., 2022

On the Complexities of Understanding Matching Mechanisms.
CoRR, 2022

2021
Market design job market candidate profiles 2022.
SIGecom Exch., 2021

The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization.
J. ACM, 2021

Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Outside Options.
CoRR, 2021

2020
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets.
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable Matching by Trial and Error.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019
A stable marriage requires communication.
Games Econ. Behav., 2019

A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis.
CoRR, 2019

Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements.
CoRR, 2019

Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018
Aspects of Complexity and Simplicity in Economic Mechanisms (כותר נוסף בעברית: היבטים של סיבוכיות ופשטות במנגנונים כלכליים).
PhD thesis, 2018

Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof.
J. Econ. Theory, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization.
CoRR, 2018

Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality.
Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017
Incentives and gamification.
XRDS, 2017

Bounds on the Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions via Optimal-Transport Duality.
CoRR, 2017

Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments.
Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2017

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Submultiplicative Glivenko-Cantelli and Uniform Convergence of Revenues.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, 2017

2016
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Unbeatable Set Consensus via Topological and Combinatorial Reasoning.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2016

2015
Dating Strategies Are Not Obvious.
CoRR, 2015

2014
Physical Computation of Nash Equilibrium: 'Hydraulic' Resource Selection.
CoRR, 2014

Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown.
CoRR, 2014

Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists.
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013
Satisfiability and Canonisation of Timely Constraints
CoRR, 2013

Good, Better, Best! - Unbeatable Protocols for Consensus and Set Consensus.
CoRR, 2013

Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm.
Electron. J. Comb., 2013

Timely Common Knowledge.
Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2013), 2013

Brief announcement: pareto optimal solutions to consensus and set consensus.
Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2013

2012
Timely Coordination in a Multi-Agent System
CoRR, 2012


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