# S. Matthew Weinberg

According to our database

Collaborative distances:

^{1}, S. Matthew Weinberg authored at least 68 papers between 2010 and 2020.Collaborative distances:

## Timeline

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## Bibliography

2020

Auction learning as a two-player game.

CoRR, 2020

Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments.

CoRR, 2020

A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design.

CoRR, 2020

Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision.

CoRR, 2020

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents.

CoRR, 2020

When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase.

CoRR, 2020

Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions.

Proceedings of the Proccedings of the 52nd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2020

Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence.

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples.

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization.

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard.

Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees.

Proceedings of the 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2020

Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks.

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design.

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information.

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.

CoRR, 2019

Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities.

Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, 2019

Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality.

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items.

Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2019

Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly.

Proceedings of the 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2019

Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols.

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms.

Proceedings of the Conference on Learning Theory, 2019

2018

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints.

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Editors' introduction.

SIGecom Exch., 2018

How Does Advertising Depend on Competition? Evidence from U.S. Brewing.

Manag. Sci., 2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.

CoRR, 2018

Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts.

Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, 2018

The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer.

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph.

Proceedings of the 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2018

The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization.

Proceedings of the 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2018

2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules.

Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2017

Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler.

Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, 2017

2016

Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design.

Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2016

A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design.

SIGecom Exch., 2016

Signal to noise in matching markets.

CoRR, 2016

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

CoRR, 2016

Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons.

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2016

On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward.

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016

2015

Pricing lotteries.

J. Econ. Theory, 2015

Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.

CoRR, 2015

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies.

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs.

Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Learning @ Scale, 2015

2014

Algorithms for strategic agents.

PhD thesis, 2014

A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer.

SIGecom Exch., 2014

Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms.

CoRR, 2014

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2014

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design.

Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

2012

Matroid prophet inequalities.

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design.

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization.

Proceedings of the 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012

2011

On optimal multidimensional mechanism design.

SIGecom Exch., 2011

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.

Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2011

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms.

Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2011

2010

Pricing Randomized Allocations.

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010