# S. Matthew Weinberg

According to our database

Collaborative distances:

^{1}, S. Matthew Weinberg authored at least 38 papers between 2010 and 2019.Collaborative distances:

## Timeline

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## Bibliography

2019

Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly.

Proceedings of the 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2019

2018

How Does Advertising Depend on Competition? Evidence from U.S. Brewing.

Management Science, 2018

Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts.

Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, 2018

The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

Selling to a No-Regret Buyer.

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph.

Proceedings of the 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2018

The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization.

Proceedings of the 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2018

2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules.

Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2017

Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler.

Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, 2017

2016

Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design.

Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2016

A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design.

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons.

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2016

On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward.

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016

2015

Pricing lotteries.

J. Economic Theory, 2015

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity.

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies.

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints.

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs.

Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Learning @ Scale, 2015

2014

Algorithms for strategic agents.

PhD thesis, 2014

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2014

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer.

Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2014

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design.

Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

2012

Matroid prophet inequalities.

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms.

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design.

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization.

Proceedings of the 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012

2011

On optimal multidimensional mechanism design.

SIGecom Exchanges, 2011

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.

Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2011

2010

Pricing Randomized Allocations.

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010