Erel Segal-Halevi

Artif. Intell., December, 2023

Fairness for multi-self agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sophie Bade

Games Econ. Behav., September, 2023

On maximum bipartite matching with separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Pasin Manurangsi

Inf. Process. Lett., August, 2023

Keep your distance: Land division with separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Edith Elkind

Comput. Geom., August, 2023

Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eur. J. Oper. Res., June, 2023

Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Am. Math. Mon., March, 2023

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Amitay Dror

Michal Feldman

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zsuzsanna Jankó

Attila Joó

CoRR, 2023

k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dinesh Kumar Baghel

CoRR, 2023

Computing approximate roots of monotone functions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Chester Lawrence

CoRR, 2023

Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Israel Jacobovich

CoRR, 2023

A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xin Huang

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Balanced Donor Coordination.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hadi Hosseini

Andrew Searns

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hila Shoshan

Noam Hazon

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

2022

Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Comb., December, 2022

Generalized Rental Harmony.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Am. Math. Mon., 2022

Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Josué Ortega

Soc. Choice Welf., 2022

One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Roy Baharad

Soc. Choice Welf., 2022

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hadi Hosseini

Andrew Searns

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2022

Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Elad Aigner-Horev

Inf. Sci., 2022

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fedor Sandomirskiy

Oper. Res., 2022

Fair cake-cutting in practice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maria Kyropoulou

Josué Ortega

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dinesh Kumar Baghel

Vadim E. Levit

CoRR, 2022

Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Samuel Bismuth

Vladislav Makarov

CoRR, 2022

Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Edith Elkind

Artif. Intell., 2022

Redividing the cake.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022

Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hadi Hosseini

Andrew Searns

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simina Brânzei

Aviv Zohar

Proceedings of the 58th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2022

Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mithun Chakraborty

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Am. Math. Mon., 2021

Fair multi-cake cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Discret. Appl. Math., 2021

On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dvir Gilor

Artif. Intell., 2021

Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itay Shtechman

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2021

Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Edith Elkind

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021

2020

Envy-Free Division of Land.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2020

Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haris Aziz

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2020

Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shani Alkoby

David Sarne

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

Fair cake-cutting among families.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Soc. Choice Welf., 2019

Quasilinear Rental Harmony.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

The Maximin Share Dominance Relation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Fair Division with Bounded Sharing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Fair Division with Minimal Sharing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fedor Sandomirskiy

CoRR, 2019

The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Bipartite Envy-Free Matching.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2019

Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018

Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Arseniy V. Akopyan

SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2018

Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mor Nitzan

Soc. Choice Welf., 2018

Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Balázs R. Sziklai

Math. Soc. Sci., 2018

Making an Appraiser Work for You.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2018

MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

How to Charge Lightning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Simina Brânzei

Aviv Zohar

CoRR, 2017

Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mor Nitzan

CoRR, 2017

Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haris Aziz

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016

Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2016

Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Cutting a Cake without Harming the Toppings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

NegoChat-A: a chat-based negotiation agent with bounded rationality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2016

SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 9th International Symposium, 2016

2015

First Steps in Chat-Based Negotiating Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Next Frontier in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation, 2015

Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Balázs R. Sziklai

CoRR, 2015

Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2015

Fair Cake-Cutting among Groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2015

Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]