Michal Feldman

Orcid: 0000-0002-2915-8405

Affiliations:
  • Tel Aviv University, Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Israel
  • Microsoft Research, Herzliya, Israel
  • Harvard University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA (former)
  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Business Administration, Jerusalem, Israel (former)
  • University of California, Berkeley, School of Information Management and Systems, CA, USA (former, PhD 2005)


According to our database1, Michal Feldman authored at least 163 papers between 2003 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of three.
  • Erdős number3 of two.

Timeline

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Bibliography

2024
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents.
Algorithmica, May, 2024

The Query Complexity of Contracts.
CoRR, 2024

Sequential Contracts.
CoRR, 2024

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms.
CoRR, 2024

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids.
CoRR, 2024

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities.
CoRR, 2024

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes.
Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts.
Proceedings of the 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2024

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Pandora's Problem with Deadlines.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023
Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.
PLoS Comput. Biol., October, 2023

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2023

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding.
Games Econ. Behav., 2023

Fair Division via Quantile Shares.
CoRR, 2023

Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions.
CoRR, 2023

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.
CoRR, 2023

Multi-agent Contracts.
Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings.
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Interdependent Public Projects.
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Ambiguous Contracts.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents.
Proceedings of the 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2023

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations.
Proceedings of the 64th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2023

2022
Max-Min Greedy Matching.
Theory Comput., 2022

A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.
PLoS Comput. Biol., 2022

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals.
Math. Oper. Res., 2022

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality.
CoRR, 2022

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

Two-Price Equilibrium.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.
Oper. Res., 2021

Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations.
CoRR, 2021

(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond).
CoRR, 2021

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching.
Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms, 2021

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Combinatorial Contracts.
Proceedings of the 62nd IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2021

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020

A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets.
SIGecom Exch., 2020

Approximate Modularity Revisited.
SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs.
SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient.
Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.
CoRR, 2020

Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values.
CoRR, 2020

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2019

Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings.
Theory Comput. Syst., 2019

Stable Secretaries.
Algorithmica, 2019

Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk).
Proceedings of the 46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.
Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff.
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.
CoRR, 2018

An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching.
CoRR, 2018

Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents.
CoRR, 2018

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times.
Proceedings of the 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2018

2017
Pricing Identical Items.
CoRR, 2017

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Liquid Price of Anarchy.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs.
Proceedings of the 58th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017

Pricing Social Goods.
Proceedings of the 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017

2016
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium.
SIAM J. Comput., 2016

Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements.
CoRR, 2016

Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities.
CoRR, 2016

Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016

The price of anarchy in large games.
Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

On Voting and Facility Location.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Lottery Pricing Equilibria.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2016, 2016

Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap.
Proceedings of the Approximation, 2016

Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015
Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games.
SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev., 2015

Capacitated Network Design Games.
Theory Comput. Syst., 2015

Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects.
Inf. Process. Lett., 2015

On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing.
CoRR, 2015

Truthful Secretaries with Budgets.
CoRR, 2015

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

Implementing the Wisdom of Waze.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games.
Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 42nd International Colloquium, 2015

2014
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2014

Introduction.
Games Econ. Behav., 2014

A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes.
Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2014

Clearing Markets via Bundles.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, 2014

Sequential decision making with vector outcomes.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014

Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.
Proceedings of the Approximation, 2014

2013
Introduction to the Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013

Adversarial Leakage in Games.
SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2013

Mechanism design with a restricted action space.
Games Econ. Behav., 2013

Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines.
Discret. Appl. Math., 2013

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, 2013

The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, 2013

Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient.
Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2013

Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective.
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Pricing public goods for private sale.
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Efficient parking allocation as online bipartite matching with posted prices.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

2012
Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 2012

Bayesian ignorance.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 2012

Envy-Free Makespan Approximation.
SIAM J. Comput., 2012

Combinatorial agency.
J. Econ. Theory, 2012

Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games.
Oper. Res., 2012

On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections.
Artif. Intell., 2012

Revenue maximizing envy-free multi-unit auctions with budgets.
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Mechanism design on discrete lines and cycles.
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Mechanisms and Impossibilities for Truthful, Envy-Free Allocations.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 5th International Symposium, 2012

Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012

Mastering multi-player games.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012

On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011
Randomized Strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location and the Mini-Sum-of-Squares Objective
CoRR, 2011

Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions
CoRR, 2011

Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricing.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Solving Cooperative Reliability Games.
Proceedings of the UAI 2011, 2011

Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, 4th International Symposium, 2011

Economical Graph Discovery.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2011

2010
Structured coalitions in resource selection games.
ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol., 2010

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks.
Math. Oper. Res., 2010

Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2010

A note on competitive diffusion through social networks.
Inf. Process. Lett., 2010

Walking in circles.
Discret. Math., 2010

On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness
CoRR, 2010

Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games
CoRR, 2010

Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

Playing Games without Observing Payoffs.
Proceedings of the Innovations in Computer Science, 2010

2009
The Proportional-Share Allocation Market for Computational Resources.
IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst., 2009

A prescriptive approach for playing games.
SIGecom Exch., 2009

Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2009

Efficient graph topologies in network routing games.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strong price of anarchy.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks
CoRR, 2009

Optimal Incentives for Participation with Type-Dependent Externalities.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Partition Equilibrium.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

2007
Hidden-Action in Network Routing.
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2007

2006
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems.
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 2006

Implementation with a bounded action space.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

Combinatorial agency.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

2005
Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems.
SIGecom Exch., 2005

The Evolution of Cooperation under Cheap Pseudonyms.
Proceedings of the 7th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC 2005), 2005

A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

Hidden-action in multi-hop routing.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

2004
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

2003
Workshop Report for 2nd International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS '03) 21-22 February 2003 - Claremont Hotel, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Proceedings of the Peer-to-Peer Systems II, Second International Workshop, 2003


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