Tomer Ezra

According to our database, Tomer Ezra authored at least 32 papers between 2017 and 2024.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of four.
• Erdős number of three.

2024

Sequential Contracts.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger

CoRR, 2024

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang

CoRR, 2024

Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization.

Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker

CoRR, 2024

Contracts with Inspections.

Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo

CoRR, 2024

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities.

Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo

CoRR, 2024

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger

Proceedings of the 15th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2024

Pandora's Problem with Deadlines.

Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

Fair Division with Interdependent Values.

Georgios Birmpas, Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Matteo Russo

CoRR, 2023

Prophet Inequalities via the Expected Competitive Ratio.

Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Matteo Russo, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, 2023

The Importance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Combinatorial Bayesian Settings.

Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 19th International Conference, 2023

Multi-agent Contracts.

Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim

Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

Proceedings of the 2023 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2023

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost.

Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

2022

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

Math. Oper. Res., 2022

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

CoRR, 2022

On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations.

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 18th International Conference, 2022

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

2021

Simple Mechanisms for Limited Information Settings

Tomer Ezra

PhD thesis, 2021

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements.

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Combinatorial Contracts.

Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim

Proceedings of the 62nd IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2021

Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations.

Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020

A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Secretary Matching with General Arrivals.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

CoRR, 2020

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019

Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 60th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2019

2018

Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

CoRR, 2018

Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017

Pricing Identical Items.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong

CoRR, 2017

Pricing Social Goods.

Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman

Proceedings of the 25th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017