# Shahar Dobzinski

According to our database

Collaborative distances:

^{1}, Shahar Dobzinski authored at least 46 papers between 2005 and 2019.Collaborative distances:

## Timeline

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Book In proceedings Article PhD thesis Other## Links

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## Bibliography

2019

The communication complexity of local search.

Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2019

2018

Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets.

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect.

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Combinatorial Cost Sharing.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions.

ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2017

Combinatorial Cost Sharing.

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations.

J. ACM, 2016

Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.

Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2016

Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation.

Proceedings of the IEEE 57th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2016

2015

Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2015

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium.

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015

2014

Economic efficiency requires interaction.

Proceedings of the Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2014

Reallocation mechanisms.

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes.

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, 2014

Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets.

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 41st International Colloquium, 2014

2013

Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

2012

Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms.

Math. Oper. Res., 2012

From query complexity to computational complexity.

Proceedings of the 44th Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, 2012

Sketching valuation functions.

Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2012

The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions.

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Optimization with demand oracles.

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

On bitcoin and red balloons.

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

2011

Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy.

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations.

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

Mechanisms for complement-free procurement.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2009

VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism.

SIGecom Exchanges, 2009

An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem.

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2009

2008

Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters.

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, 2008

Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions.

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, 2008

Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits.

Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2008

Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents.

Proceedings of the 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2008

2007

Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms?

SIGecom Exchanges, 2007

Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms.

Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2007

Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), 2007

Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2007

2006

Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms.

Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), 2006

Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.

Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2006

An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.

Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2006

Welfare maximization in congestion games.

Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

2005

Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders.

Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2005