Moshe Babaioff

Amitai Frey

CoRR, 2024

2023

On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shiri Ron

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

2022

The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sigal Oren

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Truthful Online Scheduling of Cloud Workloads under Uncertainty.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

Optimal Collaterals in Multi-Enterprise Investment Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yoav Kolumbus

Eyal Winter

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

On Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair-Share Allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tomer Ezra

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 18th International Conference, 2022

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

2021

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2021

A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ron Kupfer

CoRR, 2021

On the Impact of Information Acquisition and Aftermarkets on Auction Efficiency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ruty Mundel

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tomer Ezra

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tomer Ezra

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'17.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Scott Duke Kominers

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2020

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2020

Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kira Goldner

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019

Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

A New Approach to Fair Distribution of Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 2019

Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Assaf Romm

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Matroid Secretary Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

CoRR, 2018

Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sigal Oren

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, 2018

Optimal Deterministic Mechanisms for an Additive Buyer.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aviad Rubinstein

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yang Cai

Mingfei Zhao

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017

Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017

Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web Companion, 2017

Submultiplicative Glivenko-Cantelli and Uniform Convergence of Revenues.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Noga Alon

Yishay Mansour

Shay Moran

Amir Yehudayoff

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2017, 2017

Selling Complementary Goods: Dynamics, Efficiency and Revenue.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2017

2016

Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2016

Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moran Feldman

Moshe Tennenholtz

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

Networks of Complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2016

2015

Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert D. Kleinberg

J. ACM, 2015

Auctions with online supply.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Aaron Roth

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Price Competition, Fluctuations and Welfare Guarantees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Renato Paes Leme

Balasubramanian Sivan

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

2014

Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yogeshwer Sharma

SIAM J. Comput., 2014

Price competition in online combinatorial markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Renato Paes Leme

Proceedings of the 23rd International World Wide Web Conference, 2014

Contract complexity.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Eyal Winter

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013

The communication burden of payment determination.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael Schapira

Games Econ. Behav., 2013

Bertrand networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Brendan Lucier

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

2012

Combinatorial agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2012

Optimal mechanisms for selling information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Renato Paes Leme

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

2011

On Bitcoin and red balloons.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2011

Only valuable experts can be valued.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2010

Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2010

2009

Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. ACM, 2009

Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Congestion games with malicious players.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christos H. Papadimitriou

Games Econ. Behav., 2009

Secretary problems: weights and discounts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2009

Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yogeshwer Sharma

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jason D. Hartline

Robert D. Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

2008

Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Encyclopedia of Algorithms - 2008 Edition, 2008

Online auctions and generalized secretary problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2008

Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2008

Informational overhead of incentive compatibility.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Patrick Briest

Piotr Krysta

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, 2008

2007

Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicole Immorlica

Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2007

On the Optimality and Interconnection of Valiant Load-Balancing Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

John Chuang

Proceedings of the INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, 2007

A Knapsack Secretary Problem with Applications.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation, 2007

2006

Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2006

Combinatorial agency.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

Impersonation-Based Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

2005

Strategic aspects of computational markets (היבטים אסטרטגים בשווקים חישוביים.).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2005

Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

William E. Walsh

Decis. Support Syst., 2005

Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

2004

Concurrent Auctions Across The Supply Chain.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]