Steven J. Brams

According to our database1, Steven J. Brams authored at least 38 papers between 1978 and 2018.

Collaborative distances:
  • Dijkstra number2 of five.
  • Erdős number3 of two.

Timeline

Legend:

Book 
In proceedings 
Article 
PhD thesis 
Other 

Links

On csauthors.net:

Bibliography

2018
Making the Rules of Sports Fairer.
SIAM Review, 2018

2013
N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division.
The American Mathematical Monthly, 2013

Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2013

Game Theory and Politics.
Dover Books on Science, Dover Publications, ISBN: 978-0-486-43497-1, 2013

2012
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2012

On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm.
SIAM Review, 2011

Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargaining.
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2011), 2011

Game Theory and the Humanities - Bridging Two Worlds.
MIT Press, ISBN: 978-0-262-01522-6, 2011

2010
A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2010

2009
Fair Division*.
Proceedings of the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009

Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake.
The American Mathematical Monthly, 2009

Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference.
Proceedings of the Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, 2009

2008
Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures.
Math. Comput. Model., 2008

Proportional pie-cutting.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2008

The Presidential Election Game, 2nd edition.
CRC Press, ISBN: 978-1-568-81348-6, 2008

2007
07261 Abstracts Collection -- Fair Division.
Proceedings of the Fair Division, 24.06. - 29.06.2007, 2007

07261 Summary -- Fair Division.
Proceedings of the Fair Division, 24.06. - 29.06.2007, 2007

Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited.
Proceedings of the Fair Division, 24.06. - 29.06.2007, 2007

Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure.
Proceedings of the Fair Division, 24.06. - 29.06.2007, 2007

Mathematics and democracy - designing better voting and fair-division procedures.
Princeton University Press, ISBN: 978-0-691-13321-8, 2007

Superior beings - if they exist, how would we know: game-theoretic implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, 2nd edition.
Springer, ISBN: 978-0-387-48065-7, 2007

Approval voting, 2nd edition.
Springer, ISBN: 978-0-387-49895-9, 2007

2005
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2005

2004
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond.
Math. Soc. Sci., 2004

2003
Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up.
Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2003), 2003

2002
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
Games Econ. Behav., 2002

2001
A nail-biting election.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001

2000
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2000

The win-win solution - guaranteeing fair shares to everybody.
W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN: 978-0-393-32081-7, 2000

1999
Agreement through Threats: the Northern Ireland Case.
IGTR, 1999

1996
Fair division - from cake-cutting to dispute resolution.
Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 978-0-521-55644-6, 1996

1995
On Envy-Free Cake Division.
J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A, 1995

1988
Game Theory and National Security.
Wiley, ISBN: 978-1-55786-003-3, 1988

1987
Optimal Threats.
Operations Research, 1987

1982
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries.
Math. Soc. Sci., 1982

1980
Letter to the Editor - Authors' Rejoinder.
Operations Research, 1980

1978
Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges.
Operations Research, 1978


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