Warut Suksompong

Inf. Process. Lett., 2025

Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Markus Utke

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2025

Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tomohiko Yokoyama

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2025

Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2025

The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel Halpern

Ariel D. Procaccia

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2025

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Karen Frilya Celine

Sheung Man Yuen

Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2025

2024

Correction: Approval-based voting with mixed goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Soc. Choice Welf., June, 2024

Envy-free house allocation with minimum subsidy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res. Lett., 2024

Reforming an Unfair Allocation by Exchanging Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Complexity of Round-Robin Allocation with Potentially Noisy Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

Expanding the Reach of Social Choice Theory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Ordinal Maximin Guarantees for Group Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Luisa Montanari

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Fast & Fair: A Collaborative Platform for Fair Division Applications.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jiatong Han

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

Reachability of Fair Allocations via Sequential Exchanges.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024

2023

On maximum bipartite matching with separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Process. Lett., August, 2023

Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Am. Math. Mon., March, 2023

Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: Monotonicity and strategyproofness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2023

Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sheung Man Yuen

CoRR, 2023

Balanced Donor Coordination.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Approximate Envy-Freeness in Graphical Cake Cutting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sheung Man Yuen

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Settling the Score: Portioning with Cardinal Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

Differentially Private Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Topological Distance Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martin Bullinger

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

2022

On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2022

A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Margin of victory for tournament solutions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2022

Guest editorial: special issue on fair division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nicolas Maudet

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2022

Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

Fixing Knockout Tournaments With Seeds.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Felix Brandt

Patrick Lederer

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

The Price of Justified Representation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mithun Chakraborty

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

Truthful Cake Sharing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaohui Bei

Xinhang Lu

Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022

2021

How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Am. Math. Mon., 2021

Constraints in fair division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIGecom Exch., 2021

Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Discret. Math., 2021

On the complexity of fair house allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Oper. Res. Lett., 2021

Schelling games on graphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2021

Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Tournaments in Computational Social Choice: Recent Developments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Almost Envy-Freeness for Groups: Improved Bounds via Discrepancy Theory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Generalized Kings and Single-Elimination Winners in Random Tournaments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mithun Chakraborty

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Welfare Guarantees in Schelling Segregation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martin Bullinger

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Margin of Victory in Tournaments: Structural and Experimental Results.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Dividing a Graphical Cake.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaohui Bei

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

On the number of almost envy-free allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Discret. Appl. Math., 2020

Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2020

Contiguous Cake Cutting: Hardness Results and Approximation Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul W. Goldberg

Alexandros Hollender

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

Refining Tournament Solutions via Margin of Victory.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

On Black-Box Transformations in Downward-Closed Environments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theory Comput. Syst., 2019

Envy-freeness in house allocation problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jiarui Gan

Math. Soc. Sci., 2019

On Weighted Envy-Freeness in Indivisible Item Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Mithun Chakraborty

Yair Zick

CoRR, 2019

Connected Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2019

Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Artif. Intell., 2019

Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maria Kyropoulou

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Schelling Games on Graphs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Fairly Allocating Many Goods with Few Queries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Hoon Oh

Ariel D. Procaccia

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018

Resource allocation and decision making for groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2018

Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2018

Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christian Saile

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, 2018

Pricing Multi-unit Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, 2018

Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Xiaohui Bei

Guangda Huzhang

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2017

On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Pricing Identical Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2017

Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ian A. Kash

Peter B. Key

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, 2017

Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 10th International Symposium, 2017

Computing an Approximately Optimal Agreeable Set of Items.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016

Scheduling asynchronous round-robin tournaments.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Oper. Res. Lett., 2016

Upper Bounds on Number of Steals in Rooted Trees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Charles E. Leiserson

Tao B. Schardl

Theory Comput. Syst., 2016

Asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2016

On the efficiency of localized work stealing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Charles E. Leiserson

Tao B. Schardl

Inf. Process. Lett., 2016

An ordinal minimax theorem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Felix Brandt

Games Econ. Behav., 2016

Assigning a Small Agreeable Set of Indivisible Items to Multiple Players.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Michael P. Kim

Virginia Vassilevska Williams

Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015

Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2015

The Impossibility of Extending Random Dictatorship to Weak Preferences.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Florian Brandl

Felix Brandt

CoRR, 2015

2014

On a Subposet of the Tamari Lattice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sebastian A. Csar

Rik Sengupta