Carmine Ventre

CoRR, 2024

On the Redistribution of Maximal Extractable Value: A Dynamic Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Algorithms for Claims Trading.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martin Hoefer

Lisa Wilhelmi

Proceedings of the 41st International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, 2024

Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks through Donations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Jinyun Tong

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

Willy Wonka Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Thomas Archbold

Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2024

2023

New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., February, 2023

Financial networks with singleton liability priorities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2023

Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Clearing Financial Networks with Derivatives: From Intractability to Algorithms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Error in the Euclidean Preference Model.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Luke Thorburn

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Thomas Archbold

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Lingxiao Zhao

Proceedings of the 4th ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2023

Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ziyi Wang

Proceedings of the 4th ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2023

Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Haochen Li

Proceedings of the 4th ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2023

Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Thomas Archbold

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2023

Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Discussion Papers, 2023

2022

Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theory Comput. Syst., 2022

Information Loss in Euclidean Preference Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Luke Thorburn

CoRR, 2022

Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Albert Meroño-Peñuela

AI Commun., 2022

Accounting for Strategic Response in Limit Order Book Dynamics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ji Qi

Proceedings of the PRIMA 2022: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, 2022

Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2022

Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ji Qi

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2022

Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yanqing Ma

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2022

Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Chunli Liu

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2022

Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2022

Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yuanzi Zhu

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

2021

Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Financial Derivatives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2021

Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, 2021

Agent-based markets: equilibrium strategies and robustness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ICAIF'21: 2nd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, Virtual Event, November 3, 2021

The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zheng Gong

John G. O'Hara

Proceedings of the ICAIF'21: 2nd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, Virtual Event, November 3, 2021

Call Markets with Adaptive Clearing Intervals.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the AAMAS '21: 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2021

Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dimitris Fotakis

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

Better Model Selection with a new Definition of Feature Importance.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Cryptocurrency Trading: A Comprehensive Survey.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Ascertaining price formation in cryptocurrency markets with DeepLearning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Angelina Vidali

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2020

Novel Paradigm for the design of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science, 2020

Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maria Kyropoulou

Proceedings of the 47th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, 2020

Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zheng Gong

John G. O'Hara

Proceedings of the ICAIF '20: The First ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, 2020

2019

Social pressure in opinion dynamics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2019

Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Algorithms, 2019

Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small Domains.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, 2019

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maria Kyropoulou

Xiaomeng Zhang

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, 2019

Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation - The Case of Machine Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 12th International Symposium, 2019

Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the PRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, 2019

Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Maria Kyropoulou

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

How to Get the Most from Goods Donated to Charities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Christopher Culley

Ji Qi

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2019

2018

Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2018

The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dimitris Fotakis

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2018

On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Combinatorial Auctions Without Money.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dimitris Fotakis

Algorithmica, 2017

Social Pressure in Opinion Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016

Heterogeneous facility location without money.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2016

Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul W. Goldberg

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2016

What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

2015

Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2015

Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Orestis Telelis

J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2015

Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Annamária Kovács

Ulrich Meyer

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games - (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2015, 2015

Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Orestis Telelis

Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Cascade Model with Contextual Externalities and Bounded User Memory for Sponsored Search Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Truthful Mechanisms without Money for Non-Utilitarian Heterogeneous Facility Location.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gabor Aranyi

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

2014

Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2014

Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2014

Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2014

Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money on the Line.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 18-22 August 2014, Prague, Czech Republic, 2014

Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2014

2013

Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2013

On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul W. Goldberg

Rahul Savani

Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Int. J. Game Theory, 2013

Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul W. Goldberg

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

2012

Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Comput. Theory, 2012

On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Networks, 2012

Metastability of Potential Games

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2012

2011

A response to "Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle".

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011

Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011

2010

Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010

2009

Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2009

On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

On the Price of Anarchy of Restricted Job Scheduling Games.

[BibT_eX]

Proceedings of the Theoretical Computer Science, 11th Italian Conference, 2009

Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ivan Visconti

Proceedings of the Progress in Cryptology, 2009

2008

Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ivan Visconti

Proceedings of the Public Key Cryptography, 2008

2006

Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, Second International Workshop, 2006

The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the STACS 2006, 2006

New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages and Programming, 33rd International Colloquium, 2006

2005

Improvements for Truthful Mechanisms with Verifiable One-Parameter Selfish Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation and Online Algorithms, Third International Workshop, 2005

Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Structural Information and Communication Complexity, 2005

2004

More Powerful and Simpler Cost-Sharing Methods.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Approximation and Online Algorithms, Second International Workshop, 2004

Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Structural Information and Communication Complexity, 2004

Energy-efficient broadcasting in ad-hoc networks: combining MSTs with shortest-path trees.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]