Daniel Schoepflin

According to our database, Daniel Schoepflin authored at least 12 papers between 2021 and 2025.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of four.
• Erdős number of three.

2025

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin

Oper. Res., 2025

Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization.

Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker

Proceedings of the 57th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2025

Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the 2025 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2025

A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events.

Chun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 18th International Symposium, 2025

On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms.

Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the AAAI-25, Sponsored by the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, February 25, 2025

2024

Optimal Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization.

Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker

CoRR, 2024

2022

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.

Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond.

Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.

Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

2021

Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.

Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.

Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021