Vasilis Gkatzelis

According to our database, Vasilis Gkatzelis authored at least 53 papers between 2010 and 2023.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of three.
• Erdős number of three.

2023

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions.

Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu

CoRR, 2023

Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions.

Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan

CoRR, 2023

Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma

CoRR, 2023

Best of Both Distortion Worlds.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions.

Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2023

Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions.

Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023

EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare.

Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the ECAI 2023 - 26th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, September 30 - October 4, 2023, Kraków, Poland, 2023

2022

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents.

Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta

Oper. Res., 2022

Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents.

Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Juba Ziani

CoRR, 2022

Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions.

Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Artur Gorokh, Billy Jin

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions.

Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions.

Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location.

Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond.

Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2022

Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods.

Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2022

2021

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2021

Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 14th International Symposium, 2021

PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents.

Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods.

Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin

Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2021

2020

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2020

Online Nash Social Welfare via Promised Utilities.

Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Billy Jin, Vasilis Gkatzelis

CoRR, 2020

A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching.

Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games.

George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah

Proceedings of the 61st IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2020

2019

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2019

Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints.

Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders.

Eric J. Friedman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Scott Shenker

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2018

2017

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2017

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions.

Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden

Math. Oper. Res., 2017

Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling.

Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Cosimo Vinci

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, 2017

Participation incentives on a wireless random access erasure collision channel.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Steven Weber

Proceedings of the 12th workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, 2017

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty.

Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare.

Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2016

Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden

Oper. Res., 2016

2015

SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016.

Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items.

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis

SIGecom Exch., 2015

Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games.

Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver

Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Pricing private data.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christina Aperjis, Bernardo A. Huberman

Electron. Mark., 2015

2014

Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games.

Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, 2014

2013

Incentive-Centered Design of Money-Free Mechanisms.

Vasilis Gkatzelis

PhD thesis, 2013

Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments.

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel

Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2013

Positive results for mechanism design without money.

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel

Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

2012

The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games.

Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis

Theory Comput. Syst., 2012

Mechanism Design for Fair Division

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel

CoRR, 2012

Truthful Mechanisms for Proportionally Fair Allocations

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel

CoRR, 2012

2011

Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms.

Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver

Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2011

2010

Coordination Mechanisms for Weighted Sum of Completion Times in Machine Scheduling

Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni

CoRR, 2010