Ophir Friedler

According to our database, Ophir Friedler authored at least 14 papers between 2014 and 2025.

Collaborative distances:

• Dijkstra number of four.
• Erdős number of three.

2025

Practical Multi-Task Learning for Rare Conversions in Ad Tech.

Yuval Dishi, Ophir Friedler, Yonatan Karni, Natalia Silberstein, Yulia Stolin

CoRR, July, 2025

DCN^2: Interplay of Implicit Collision Weights and Explicit Cross Layers for Large-Scale Recommendation.

Blaz Skrlj, Yonatan Karni, Grega Gaspersic, Blaz Mramor, Yulia Stolin, Martin Jakomin, Jasna Urbancic, Yuval Dishi, Natalia Silberstein, Ophir Friedler, Assaf Klein

CoRR, June, 2025

Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box.

Ophir Friedler, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin, Ariana Tang

Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025, 2025

2021

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

Oper. Res., 2021

2020

Simple Mechanisms for Complex Environments

Ophir Friedler

PhD thesis, 2020

A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets.

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler

SIGecom Exch., 2020

2018

99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition.

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders.

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract.

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements.

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner

CoRR, 2016

Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements.

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

2015

Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games.

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler

SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev., 2015

A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games.

Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler

Proceedings of the Automata, Languages, and Programming - 42nd International Colloquium, 2015

2014

Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing.

Ophir Friedler, Wisam Kadry, Arkadiy Morgenshtein, Amir Nahir, Vitali Sokhin

Proceedings of the Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition, 2014