Paul Dütting

Yarden Rashti

CoRR, March, 2025

Fully Dynamic Submodular Maximization over Matroids.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Algorithms, January, 2025

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, January, 2025

Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2025 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2025

2024

An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Brendan Lucier

SIAM J. Comput., 2024

Secretaries with Advice.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2024

Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2024

The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2024

Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhe Feng

Harikrishna Narasimhan

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath

J. ACM, 2024

Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci., 2024

Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

The Cost of Consistency: Submodular Maximization with Constant Recourse.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Online Matroid Embeddings.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

The Query Complexity of Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2024

Mechanism Design for Large Language Models.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2024, 2024

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yoav Gal Tzur

Proceedings of the 2024 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2024

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gagan Aggarwal

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru

Federico Fusco

Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2024

Consistent Submodular Maximization.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, 2024

Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Brendan Lucier

Sahil Singla

Proceedings of the 65th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2024

2023

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2023

Multi-agent Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis

Evangelia Gergatsouli

Rojin Rezvan

Yifeng Teng

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Ambiguous Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Daniel Peretz

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Trading Prophets.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

José Correa

Andrés Cristi

MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi

Jan Olkowski

Kevin Schewior

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Optimal No-Regret Learning for One-Sided Lipschitz Functions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

2022

Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2022

Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Deletion Robust Non-Monotone Submodular Maximization over Matroids.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2022

Price Manipulability in First-Price Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Johannes Brustle

Balasubramanian Sivan

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

Calibrated Click-Through Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022, Virtual Event, Lyon, France, April 25, 2022

Single-Sample Prophet Inequalities via Greedy-Ordered Selection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Constantine Caramanis

Orestis Papadigenopoulos

Emmanouil Pountourakis

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

Deletion Robust Submodular Maximization over Matroids.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2022

2021

The Complexity of Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2021

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Éva Tardos

Math. Oper. Res., 2021

Calibrated Click-Through Auctions: An Information Design Approach.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Prophet Inequalities for Matching with a Single Sample.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2021

Optimal auctions through deep learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhe Feng

Harikrishna Narasimhan

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath

Commun. ACM, 2021

Efficient two-sided markets with limited information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the STOC '21: 53rd Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2021

Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Tal Alon

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

Unknown I.I.D. Prophets: Better Bounds, Streaming Algorithms, and a New Impossibility (Extended Abstract).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

Fairness and Bias in Online Selection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021

Combinatorial Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 62nd IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2021

2020

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

SIAM J. Comput., 2020

Streaming Algorithms for Online Selection Problems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

2019

Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2019

Simple versus Optimal Contracts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martin Starnberger

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2018

Prophet Inequalities for Independent Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

2017

The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Vasilis Gkatzelis

Math. Oper. Res., 2017

Modularity and greed in double auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2017

Game Theory Meets Computational Learning Theory (Dagstuhl Seminar 17251).

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Paul W. Goldberg

Yishay Mansour

Dagstuhl Reports, 2017

Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Zhe Feng

Harikrishna Narasimhan

CoRR, 2017

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 58th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017

2016

Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Revenue Gaps for Discriminatory and Anonymous Sequential Posted Pricing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Max Klimm

CoRR, 2016

Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

2015

An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Martin Starnberger

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2015

Algorithms against Anarchy: Understanding Non-Truthful Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2015

Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Robert Kleinberg

Proceedings of the Algorithms - ESA 2015, 2015

2014

Mechanism with unique learnable equilibria.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Éva Tardos

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013

Challenges in Algorithmic Mechanism Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

PhD thesis, 2013

Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2013

Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian Method.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Process. Lett., 2013

2012

Maximizing revenue from strategic recommendations under decaying trust.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 21st ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, 2012

2011

Offline file assignments for online load balancing.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inf. Process. Lett., 2011

Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

2010

How much is your personal recommendation worth?

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, 2010

Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Algorithms and Complexity, 7th International Conference, 2010

2009

On the Pricing of Recommendations and Recommending Strategically

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]