Rann Smorodinsky

Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

2022

Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Oper. Res., 2022

The secretary recommendation problem.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Niklas Hahn

Martin Hoefer

Games Econ. Behav., 2022

Herd Design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Roy Shahmoon

Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 15th International Symposium, 2022

2021

Privacy, Patience, and Protection.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Dyn. Games Appl., 2021

On Social Networks that Support Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Fedor Sandomirskiy

Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

2020

On the behavioral implications of differential privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gail Gilboa-Freedman

Theor. Comput. Sci., 2020

On the properties that characterize privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gail Gilboa-Freedman

Math. Soc. Sci., 2020

Multi-issue social learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2020

Identifiable information structures.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yakov Babichenko

Games Econ. Behav., 2020

Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2020

A Cardinal Comparison of Experts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itay Kavaler

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, 2020

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Niklas Hahn

Martin Hoefer

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020

2019

On comparison of experts.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Itay Kavaler

Games Econ. Behav., 2019

Stable Secretaries.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Algorithmica, 2019

Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moran Koren

Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018

Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kobbi Nissim

Math. Oper. Res., 2018

Recommendation Systems and Self Motivated Users.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2018

The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moran Koren

Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017

Perception games and privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2017

The Price of Anarchy in Hypergraph Coloring Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Shakhar Smorodinsky

CoRR, 2017

The Crowdfunding Game.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Moran Koren

Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 13th International Conference, 2017

Forecast Aggregation.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Yakov Babichenko

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

2016

Designing social networks for efficient learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2016

Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

2015

Economic Recommendation Systems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2015

2014

Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Rakefet Rozen

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2014

Signaling Competition and Social Welfare.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gleb Polevoy

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2014

Subjective Perception Games and Privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

CoRR, 2014

2013

Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Inbar Aricha

Int. J. Game Theory, 2013

2012

Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working Paper)

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Gleb Polevoy

CoRR, 2012

Privacy-aware mechanism design.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kobbi Nissim

Claudio Orlandi

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012

Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Kobbi Nissim

Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science 2012, 2012

2011

Greediness and Equilibrium in Congestion Games

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sergey Kuniavsky

CoRR, 2011

Equilibrium and Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Sergey Kuniavsky

CoRR, 2011

2010

Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

J. Econ. Theory, 2010

2007

The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

J. Econ. Theory, 2007

2006

Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations - The anonymous case.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Games Econ. Behav., 2006

2005

Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2005

Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005, 2005

2004

Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Abraham Neyman

Math. Oper. Res., 2004

Belief-based equilibrium.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alvaro Sandroni

Games Econ. Behav., 2004

Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Proceedings of the UAI '04, 2004

2003

Calibration with Many Checking Rules.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alvaro Sandroni

Rakesh V. Vohra

Math. Oper. Res., 2003

2001

Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

Games Econ. Behav., 2001

2000

The reflection effect for constant risk averse agents.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Math. Soc. Sci., 2000

Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Nabil I. Al-Najjar

J. Econ. Theory, 2000

1999

The speed of rational learning.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Alvaro Sandroni

Int. J. Game Theory, 1999

1996

Compatible Measures and Merging.

[BibT_eX]

[DOI]

Ehud Lehrer