Yang Cai

Orcid: 0000-0002-5426-1324

Affiliations:
  • Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
  • McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada (former)
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA (former)


According to our database1, Yang Cai authored at least 58 papers between 2009 and 2024.

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Bibliography

2024
Tractable Local Equilibria in Non-Concave Games.
CoRR, 2024

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions.
CoRR, 2024

Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games.
CoRR, 2024

2023
Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games.
CoRR, 2023

The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets.
CoRR, 2023

Curvature-Independent Last-Iterate Convergence for Games on Riemannian Manifolds.
CoRR, 2023

Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games.
CoRR, 2023

User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization.
CoRR, 2023

On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade.
Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2023

Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization.
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023

Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Bandit Feedback.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, 2023

Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning, 2023

Accelerated Single-Call Methods for Constrained Min-Max Optimization.
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations, 2023

Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders.
Proceedings of the 64th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2023

2022
Accelerated Algorithms for Monotone Inclusions and Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization.
CoRR, 2022

Tight Last-Iterate Convergence of the Extragradient Method for Constrained Monotone Variational Inequalities.
CoRR, 2022

Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms.
Proceedings of the STOC '22: 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, Rome, Italy, June 20, 2022

Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11, 2022

Finite-Time Last-Iterate Convergence for Learning in Multi-Player Games.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, 2022

2021
An Efficient <i>∊</i>-BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization.
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021

On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization.
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021

On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items.
Proceedings of the EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021

How to Sell Information Optimally: An Algorithmic Study.
Proceedings of the 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2021

2020
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms.
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., 2020

Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

2019
An Efficient ε-BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization.
CoRR, 2019

Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality.
SIGecom Exch., 2018

The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 31: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2018, 2018

2017
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples.
Proceedings of the 58th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017

2016
Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design.
Encyclopedia of Algorithms, 2016

A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design.
SIGecom Exch., 2016

Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax.
Math. Oper. Res., 2016

On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2016

2015
Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing.
Games Econ. Behav., 2015

Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, 2015

Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources.
Proceedings of The 28th Conference on Learning Theory, 2015

2014
Speaker Verification for Multi-Task Interactions.
Interact. Comput., 2014

Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 10th International Conference, 2014

Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity.
Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014

2013
Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework.
PhD thesis, 2013

Designing Markets for Daily Deals.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 9th International Conference, 2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design.
Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013

2012
Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation?
Proceedings of the Proceedings Third International Symposium on Games, 2012

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization.
Proceedings of the 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012

2011
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design.
SIGecom Exch., 2011

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms.
Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex., 2011

On Minmax Theorems for Multiplayer Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2011

A Tight Lower Bound for Streett Complementation.
Proceedings of the IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, 2011

Tight Upper Bounds for Streett and Parity Complementation.
Proceedings of the Computer Science Logic, 2011

2009
Api hyperlinking via structural overlap.
Proceedings of the 7th joint meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of Software Engineering, 2009

An Improved Lower Bound for the Complementation of Rabin Automata.
Proceedings of the 24th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, 2009


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