Kira Goldner

Orcid: 0000-0003-3008-2724

Affiliations:
  • Boston University, Faculty of Computing & Data Sciences, MA, USA
  • Columbia University, Data Science Institute, NY, USA (former)
  • University of Washington, Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, Seattle, MA, USA (former, PhD 2019)


According to our database1, Kira Goldner authored at least 22 papers between 2016 and 2024.

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Bibliography

2024
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue.
Math. Oper. Res., 2024

Simple Mechanisms for Utility Maximization: Approximating Welfare in the I.I.D. Unit-Demand Setting.
CoRR, 2024

To Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

Non-Adaptive Matroid Prophet Inequalities.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, 2024

2023
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations.
Proceedings of the 64th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2023

2022
Private Interdependent Valuations.
Proceedings of the 2022 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2022

2021
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization.
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2021

2020
Report on YoungEC 19.
SIGecom Exch., 2020

When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase.
CoRR, 2020

Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets.
Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2020

Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition.
Proceedings of the 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, 2020

2019
Mechanism Design for a Complex World: Rethinking Standard Assumptions.
PhD thesis, 2019

Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

2018
A report on the workshop on mechanism design for social good.
SIGecom Exch., 2018

Mechanism design for social good.
AI Matters, 2018

Revenue Maximization with an Uncertainty-Averse Buyer.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2018

Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing.
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018

2017
Minimal partial languages and automata.
RAIRO Theor. Informatics Appl., 2017

Aversion to Uncertainty and Its Implications for Revenue Maximization.
CoRR, 2017

2016
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016

The FedEx Problem.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016


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