Vincent Conitzer

According to our database1, Vincent Conitzer authored at least 208 papers between 2002 and 2020.

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Awards

ACM Fellow

ACM Fellow 2019, "For contributions to game theory, social choice theory, and mechanism design".

Timeline

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Bibliography

2020
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.
CoRR, 2020

Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments.
CoRR, 2020

Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.
Artif. Intell., 2020

Combinatorial Ski Rental and Online Bipartite Matching.
Proceedings of the EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2020

Artificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.
Proceedings of the AIES '20: AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, 2020

2019
Puzzle: the AI circus: (puzzle in honor of Tuomas Sandholm's 50th birthday).
SIGecom Exch., 2019

The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies.
Math. Oper. Res., 2019

Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically Transformed.
Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019, 2019

When Samples Are Strategically Selected.
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019

Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019

A Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

A PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents' Judgments.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

Designing Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019

2018
Dynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach.
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., 2018

Can Artificial Intelligence Do Everything That We Can?
CoRR, 2018

Technical perspective: Designing algorithms and the fairness criteria they should satisfy.
Commun. ACM, 2018

Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2018

Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 14th International Conference, 2018

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?
Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 2018

Disarmament Games With Resource.
Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018

2017
Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2017

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting.
Soc. Choice Welf., 2017

Game-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2017

Complexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid.
CoRR, 2017

Fair Public Decision Making.
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Fair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated Distributions: Can We Learn Optimal Mechanisms?
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2017

Disarmament Games.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

Automated Design of Robust Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017

2016
Barriers to Manipulation in Voting.
Proceedings of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016

Introduction to Computational Social Choice.
Proceedings of the Handbook of Computational Social Choice, 2016

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2016

On Stackelberg mixed strategies.
Synth., 2016

Nash Welfare and Round Robin Share.
CoRR, 2016

Philosophy in the Face of Artificial Intelligence.
CoRR, 2016

Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment.
Proceedings of the Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, 2016

The Revelation Principle for Mechanism Design with Reporting Costs.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016

False-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks.
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, 2016

Timeability of Extensive-Form Games.
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Catcher-Evader Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

ATUCAPTS: Automated Tests that a User Cannot Pass Twice Simultaneously.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Signaling in Bayesian Stackelberg Games.
Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

Role Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation: (Extended Abstract).
Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, 2016

Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Computing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners).
Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

Maximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility.
Proceedings of the Thirtieth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2016

2015
Can rational choice guide us to correct de se beliefs?
Synth., 2015

A Dutch book against sleeping beauties who are evidential decision theorists.
Synth., 2015

Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Complexity of Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs.
Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice.
Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Crowdsourcing Societal Tradeoffs.
Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2015

Cooperative Game Solution Concepts that Maximize Stability under Noise.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

Assessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015

2014
Notes from the EC'14 program chairs.
SIGecom Exch., 2014

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2014

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties.
Games Econ. Behav., 2014

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions.
Artif. Intell., 2014

On the value of commitment.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2014

Complexity of stability-based solution concepts in multi-issue and MC-net cooperative games.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2014

Solving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

Beat the Cheater: Computing Game-Theoretic Strategies for When to Kick a Gambler out of a Casino.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

On the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2014

2013
The ACM transactions on economics and computation: An introduction.
ACM Trans. Economics and Comput., 2013

Undominated Groves Mechanisms.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2013

False-name-proof matching.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

Optimal internet auctions with costly communication.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

Security scheduling for real-world networks.
Proceedings of the International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2013

The maximum likelihood approach to voting on social networks.
Proceedings of the 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, 2013

Solving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013

Fast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013

2012
Computing Stackelberg strategies in stochastic games.
SIGecom Exch., 2012

Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?
Math. Soc. Sci., 2012

Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases.
Mark. Sci., 2012

Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2012

Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition.
Int. J. Game Theory, 2012

Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 8th International Workshop, 2012

Paradoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach.
Proceedings of the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference, 2012

Approximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains.
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, 2012

Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

Computing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2012

2011
Discussion of "A conditional game for comparing approximations".
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2011

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011

Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2011

Expressive markets for donating to charities.
Artif. Intell., 2011

Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness.
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst., 2011

An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Approximation Algorithm for Security Games with Costly Resources.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 7th International Workshop, 2011

Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), 2011

A Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Security Games with Multiple Attacker Resources.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Hypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2011, 2011

Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability.
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), 2011

A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs.
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), 2011

Dominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011

Commitment to Correlated Strategies.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2011

Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem.
Proceedings of the Metareasoning - Thinking about Thinking., 2011

2010
Editor's puzzle: borrowing as cheaply as possible.
SIGecom Exch., 2010

Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents.
Commun. ACM, 2010

Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting.
Ann. Math. Artif. Intell., 2010

Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations.
AI Magazine, 2010

Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms.
Artif. Intell., 2010

Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010

False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, 2010

Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions.
Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2010

A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), 2010

10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.
Proceedings of the Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, 2010

10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice.
Proceedings of the Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010, 2010

Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness.
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators.
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms.
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal.
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors.
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), 2010

Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010

2009
Editor's puzzle: a dutch dutch auction clock auction.
SIGecom Exch., 2009

Editor's introduction.
SIGecom Exch., 2009

Editor's puzzle: identifying the champion.
SIGecom Exch., 2009

Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries.
J. Artif. Intell. Res., 2009

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions.
Games Econ. Behav., 2009

AAAI 2008 Workshop Reports.
AI Magazine, 2009

Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 5th International Workshop, 2009

Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory.
Proceedings of the UAI 2009, 2009

A qualitative vickrey auction.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), 2009

Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To.
Proceedings of the Algorithmic Game Theory, Second International Symposium, 2009

Complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Preference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

How Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2009, 2009

Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.
Proceedings of the Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, 2009

A multiagent Turing test based on a prediction market.
Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2009), 2009

Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market.
Proceedings of the Auctions, 2009

2008
Editor's puzzle: product adoption in a social network.
SIGecom Exch., 2008

Editor's puzzle: strategically choosing products to release.
SIGecom Exch., 2008

New complexity results about Nash equilibria.
Games Econ. Behav., 2008

An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the Internet and Network Economics, 4th International Workshop, 2008

Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), 2008

Strategic betting for competitive agents.
Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments.
Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms.
Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), 2008

Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account.
Proceedings of the Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis, 2008

Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting.
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2008

2007
Editor's puzzle: combinatorial auction winner determination.
SIGecom Exch., 2007

AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.
Mach. Learn., 2007

When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?.
J. ACM, 2007

Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), 2007

Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2007, 2007

Incremental Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the IJCAI 2007, 2007

Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules.
Proceedings of the Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 1.7. - 6.7.2007, 2007

Limited Verification of Identities to Induce False-Name-Proofness.
Proceedings of the Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 1.7. - 6.7.2007, 2007

Invited talk by winner of IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award.
Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2007), 2007

2006
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.
Artif. Intell., 2006

Computing the optimal strategy to commit to.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2006), 2006

Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).
Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2006

A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium.
Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), 2006

Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.
Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), 2006

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2006

2005
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.
Proceedings of the UAI '05, 2005

Complexity of (iterated) dominance.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

Communication complexity of common voting rules.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), 2005

A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
Proceedings of the New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 2005

Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Combinatorial Auctions with <i>k-</i>wise Dependent Valuations.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the Proceedings, 2005

2004
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Computational criticisms of the revelation principle.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Expressive negotiation over donations to charities.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004

Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.
Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2004

Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).
Proceedings of the Learning Theory, 17th Annual Conference on Learning Theory, 2004

An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.
Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2004), 2004

Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.
Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2004

Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.
Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2004

2003
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2003), 2003

Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003), 2003

Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core.
Proceedings of the Proceedings 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2003), 2003

Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.
Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.
Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria.
Proceedings of the IJCAI-03, 2003

BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.
Proceedings of the Machine Learning, 2003

Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting.
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003

2002
Complexity of Mechanism Design.
Proceedings of the UAI '02, 2002

Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.
Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, July 28, 2002

Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.
Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, July 28, 2002


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